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This thesis discusses risk in Department of Defe nse 
(DoD) weapon systems acquisition.  It uses the Marine 
Corps’ Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAAV) as a case 
study in risk management strategy and techniques. 
The AAAV will provide the Marine Corps with a fast 
deploying, over-the-horizon, and waterborne insertion 
capability.  The AAAV’s improvements over the currently 
fielded Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAV) will provide 
Marines with a highly survivable and lethal weapon system 
ashore. 
Risk is the possibility of damage, injury or loss.  
The severity of a risk is determined by a combination of 
both the probability of an unfavorable event occurring and 
the severity of the event’s occurrence.   
Risks are present in virtually all DoD developmental 
programs.  Programs suffer from risks in technical 
challenges, unstable system requirements, missing schedule 
milestones, unpredictable funding and cost overruns.   
The DoD currently uses techniques to mitigate risks 
inherent in advanced system development.  This thesis 
analyzes the AAAV’s Program Definition and Risk Reduction 
(PDRR) acquisition phase risk management strategy.  The 
thesis concludes by drawing from the lessons learned in the 
AAAV program during PDRR and analyzing the application of 
the lessons learned during the AAAV’s current acquisition 
phase, System Development and Demonstration (SDD).   
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. PURPOSE 
This thesis examines the Department of Defense (DoD) 
system acquisition risk management environment by analyzing 
the Marine Corps’ Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle 
(AAAV) program.  To conduct this analysis, this thesis will 
discuss risk in the context of DoD development and 
procurement, current risk management practices in DoD and 
in the defense industry, and introduce the AAAV system to 
briefly familiarize the reader with the program .  The 
analysis will concentrate on the AAAV Program Definition 
and Risk Reduction (PDRR) Acquisition phase.  This thesis 
will discuss the AAAV’s System Development and 
Demonstration (SDD), the current Acquisition Phase, risk 
management strategy with respect to lessons learned during 
PDRR.  This thesis will conclude by examining the AAAV’s 
SDD risk management practices and providing recommendations 
for managing risk in developmental weapons system 
acquisition based on the AAAV’s experiences. 
B. BACKGROUND 
Risk is the possibility of injury, damage or loss.  In 
DoD systems acquisition, risks are the “chances of not 
achieving the results as planned.” (Forsberg, Mooz and 
Cotterman, 2000, p. 188)  In weapon system development and 
procurement, planned results are meeting operational 
deficiencies throughout DoD on time, on budget and to a 
satisfactory performance level.  The failure to satisfy the 
war fighter’s requirements can result in decreased 
effectiveness of the United States DoD. 
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Risk is the “probability or likelihood of failing to 
achieve a particular outcome” and “the consequence or 
impact of failing to achieve that outcome.” (Defense 
Acquisition University (DAU), Risk Management Guide for DoD 
Acquisition, 2001, p. 5)  A level of risk is determined by 
combining both the probability of the undesirable event 
occurring and the impact, or severity, of the event.  There 
are many categories of risk.  This thesis discusses 
technical risk, requirements risk, schedule risk and 
cost/funding risk. 
The DoD acquisition regulations are undergoing change 
at the time this thesis is being written.  The AAAV program 
executed its risk management strategy based on then current 
DoD acquisition guidelines and regulations.  This thesis 
discusses risk management practices designed to  reduce, 
eliminate, transfer and accept risk in developmental 
programs.  The purpose of this research and analysis is to 
present the risk management techniques the AAAV program has 
benefited from most.  Additionally, this thesis will 
discuss which aspects of the program’s PDRR risk management 
strategy have led to the adoption of different techniques 
in SDD and discuss why.  The overall benefit of this 
research is to familiarize the reader with successful risk 
management practices in DoD acquisition. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The primary research question this thesis addresses 
is: 
· How have the lessons learned from the AAAV’s 
Program Definition and Risk Reduction (PDRR) Risk 
Management Strategy impacted the Program’s Risk 
Management Process during System Development and 
Demonstration (SDD)? 
  3 
In order to answer the primary research question, this 
thesis will answer the following subsidiary questions to 
provide the necessary background information: 
· What are risk and risk management in Department 
of Defense (DoD) systems acquisition? 
· What techniques can DoD use to manage risk in 
developmental systems? 
· What is the AAAV program? 
· What are the lessons learned from the AAAV PDRR 
Risk Management Strategy?   
· What risk management approaches has the AAAV 
Program Office adopted to manage technical and 
programmatic risk during SDD?  
· What conclusions and recommendations can be drawn 
from this analysis? 
D. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
This author’s research methodology included extensive 
literary and Internet searches.  The primary forms of 
literature used were DoD publications and guidelines, 
magazine articles and textbooks.  The Internet provided a 
great deal of information on DoD risk management techniques 
and on the AAAV.  Of greatest benefit to the research was 
the opportunity to visit the AAAV program office in 
Virginia.  This author was able to interview Government 
program office as well as Prime Contractor personnel.  The 
information and insights were invaluable to this effort.   
E. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY 
This thesis is organized into six chapters.  A brief 
description of the chapters’ content follows. 
Chapter I introduces the thesis and the primary and 
subsidiary thesis questions.  The purpose of this chapter 
  4 
is to provide a snapshot of the thesis and its intended 
benefit to readers. 
Chapter II provides background information on the DoD 
risk management environment.  The chapter offers the reader 
the information necessary to better appreciate subsequent 
chapters.  Chapter II discusses types of risk commonly 
encountered in defense acquisitions and presents risk 
management techniques used in weapon system procurement and 
development.   
Chapter III provides the reader with background 
information on the AAAV system and its acquisition history 
to date.  The purpose of Chapter III is to familiarize the 
reader with the challenges and complexities of developing a 
system like the AAAV. 
Chapter IV discusses the AAAV PDRR risk management 
techniques.  This chapter presents the data to be analyzed.  
The chapter will focus on five areas of risk management in 
the AAAV program during PDRR: 
· Information Technology Tools 
· Risk Management Process 
· Managing Risk Through the Contracting Process 
· Government and Prime Contractor Co-location 
· Test and Evaluation 
Chapter V analyzes the AAAV PDRR risk management 
strategy and introduces elements of the AAAV SDD risk 
management plan based on PDRR lessons learned. 
Chapter VI concludes the thesis by summarizing how the 
lessons learned from the AAAV’s PDRR risk management 
strategy have helped shape the program’s current risk 
  5 
management practices in SDD.  The thesis closes by 
presenting recommendations for managing risk in DoD 
acquisition programs and offering areas for further 
research and study in DoD acquisition risk management. 
F. SUMMARY 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide the reader 
with an overview of this thesis.  The benefit of this 
research and analysis is to highlight successful risk 
management techniques in complex, developmental weapon 
systems.  The techniques and procedures may have 
application to managing risk in any program or 
organization. 
The next chapter provides background information on 
the DoD risk management environment. 
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II. BACKGROUND 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter defines risk in the context of Department 
of Defense (DoD) program management and systems 
acquisition.  The chapter then analyzes the risk management 
and risk mitigation processes in DoD.  It addresses the 
importance of striking a balance between risk acceptance 
and risk mitigation in a developmental weapon system 
program.  This chapter concludes by exploring different 
risk management techniques commonly used throughout the DoD 
acquisition environment.   
B. RISK IN THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 
Risk is the possibility of injury, damage or loss.  In 
program management, risks are the “chances of not achieving 
the results as planned.” (Forsberg, Mooz and Cotterman, 
2000, p. 188)  With rapid technological growth and 
emerging, complex mission needs, risk exists in virtually 
all of today’s DoD developmental weapons systems.  In 
Defense Acquisitions, loss refers to the impact of the risk 
to a program, which could be in the form of diminished 
performance, increased costs or schedule delays.  Risk is 
the “probability or likelihood of failing to achieve a 
particular outcome” and “the consequence or impact of 
failing to achieve that outcome.” (Defense Acquisition 
University (DAU), Risk Management Guide for DoD 
Acquisition, 2001, p. 5) 
Risk, whether programmatic, technical, managerial, 
etc., is present in DoD developmental systems.  Numerous 
  8 
risk areas exist in the acquisition environment, each 
posing a threat to the success of a program.     
1. Types of Risk 
Risks are future events that may or may not occur.  In 
DoD acquisitions, risks are future events that may 
adversely affect a program’s cost constraints, schedule or 
performance requirements.  The types of risk are often 
interrelated and are not always obvious. 
Risks are in the Program Management Office (PMO) 
(program plans, etc.); in support provided by 
other Government agencies; in threat assessments; 
and in prime contractor processes, engineering 
and manufacturing processes, and technology.  
(Risk Management Guide for DoD Acquisition, 2001, 
p. 6-7) 
A Program Manager (PM) is faced with a wide assortment 
of risk types in a program.  Identifying risk in a program 
is a vital step in managing the potential, negative impacts 
of risk.  Risk analysis is the “process of examining each 
identified risk area to refine the description of the risk, 
isolating the cause, and determining the effects.” 
(Guidelines for Successful Acquisition of Software-
Intensive Systems (GSAM), 2000, p. 6-18)  Before risk 
analysis and mitigation can be discussed, several types of 
risks that programs often face must be analyzed. 
Sources of risk can be generally classified, but are 
not limited to, one of the following categories: technical 
risk, requirements risk, schedule risk and cost/funding 
risk.  (Risk Management Guide for DoD Acquisition, 2001, p. 
7)   
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a. Technical Risk 
Technical risk is the “degree to which the 
technology proposed for the program has been demonstrated 
as capable of meeting all of the program’s objectives.” 
(Risk Management Guide for DoD Acquisition, 2001, p. 8)  
Technical risk refers to the maturity level of technology 
utilized in the system being developed.  The main concern 
with technical risk is that the system will fail to perform 
to expected standards because of immature or poorly 
integrated technology.  In software development, a great 
technical risk lies in the difficulty in measuring 
developmental progress through the use of Technical 
Performance Measurements (TPM).  TPMs are metrics that a PM 
may use to measure progress in a program.  Many TPMs used 
in DoD lend themselves to physical measurements: weight, 
height, voltage, power, etc.  Given modern systems’ 
reliance on software to achieve technical objectives, an 
inability to accurately monitor software development 
progress by means of a concrete TPM will continue to pose a 
great technical risk to a developmental program.   
b. Requirements Risk 
The requirements generation process produces 
information for decision makers on the projected mission 
needs of the war fighter.  A system evolves from the 
President’s National Security Strategy (NSS), DoD’s 
National Military Strategy (NMS), through several layers of 
analysis and refinement until the issuance of the Mission 
Needs Statement (MNS).  The MNS defines, in broad, general 
terms a deficient operational capability based on threat 
assessments.   
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Mission needs are defined in broad operational 
terms in a Mission Needs Statement (MNS) document.  Based 
on the MNS, services conduct Analyses of Alternatives (AoA) 
to assess the potential for application of fielded, DoD 
systems to meet the emergent requirement.  If no suitable 
alternative exists within DoD, an Operational Requirements 
Document (ORD) is issued which initiates the development of 
a new system.  (Systems Engineering Fundamentals, 2001, p. 
45)  Requirements definition is vital to establishing and 
adhering to a strict timeline or schedule for the program. 
The Requirements Generation Process is one of 
three elements in the DoD’s principal decision support 
system.  The system results in “identifying and documenting 
war fighting needs based on current or future mission  
deficiencies or technological opportunities.” (Systems 
Engineering Fundamentals, 2001, p. 27)  Figure 1 
illustrates the evolving Requirements Generation Process 
from the issuance of the ORD through system fielding. 
 
 
Figure 1.   Requirements Generation Process, from 
(Test and Evaluation Management Guide, 2001). 
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Ensuring that a system’s requirements can be 
identified and established early and accurately greatly 
reduces the risk of requirements creep.  Figure 2 
illustrates how the Requirements Generation Process 
overlaps with Acquisition Management and the Planning, 
Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS) and is a crucial 
element to the system development process.     
 
 
Figure 2.   Three DOD Decision Support Systems, 
from (CJCSI, 2001). 
 
The risk associated with a requirement is linked 
to the variability of the requirement.  “Creeping” or 
changing requirements can lead to schedule delays and can 
significantly impact a program.  Requirements risk is the 
“sensitivity of the program to uncertainty in the system 
description and requirements.” (Risk Management Guide for 
DoD Acquisition, 2001, p. 7) 
The ORD is reviewed several times throughout the 
life of a program.  Each review may alter original 
requirements, which can initiate time consuming and costly 
Engineering Change Proposals (ECP).  Such changes can 
negatively impact a program’s cost and schedule.  Figure 3 
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shows the interface between the system lifecycle and the 
requirements analysis process. 
 
 
Figure 3.   Current Requirements and Acquisition 
Interface, from (CJCSI, 2001). 
 
The current requirements and acquisition 
interface contains significantly fewer opportunities to 
impact a program based on creeping mission requirements 
than the previous acquisition process; however, changing 
requirements at any time introduces the risk of costly 
design changes.  Design changes late in a program’s life 
can be technologically challenging and costly to the 
Government. 
Requirements risk may occur as a result of any of 
the following: 
· Operational requirements not properly established 
or vaguely stated for program phase 
· Requirements are not stable 
· Required operating environment not described 
· Requirements do not address logistics and 
suitability 
· Requirements are too constrictive-identify 
specific solutions that force high cost (GSAM, 
2000, p. 6-29) 
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Without adequate and stable requirements 
definition early in the life of the program, the Program 
Management Office (PMO) may be forced to make costly 
changes in the system. 
c. Schedule Risk 
Program Managers are evaluated on the cost, 
schedule, and performance of their program. (DoD 5000.2 -R, 
2002, pp. 21, 24)  Many acquisition programs are driven by 
time, or schedule, rather than by significant events or 
milestones in the program’s progress.  Many factors can 
influence a program’s ability to adhere to a specific 
schedule.  Schedule risk is the “adequacy of the time 
allocated for performing the defined tasks, e.g., 
developmental, production, etc.  This factor includes the 
effects of programmatic schedule decisions, the inherent 
errors in the schedule estimating technique used, and 
external physical constraints.” (Risk Management Guide for 
DoD Acquisition, 2001, p. 8)  
Virtually every risk area can degrade a program’s 
ability to maintain a schedule.  In the design of a system, 
reliance on immature technology or an unproven development 
process can cause a program’s schedule to slip.  If 
logisticians are not involved in the early system 
development process, inadequate supportability late in 
development or after fielding can result in the necessity 
to make engineering changes causing delays in the system’s 
Initial Operational Capability (IOC).   
Pressure exists for a PM to establish an 
acquisition lifecycle schedule early in the system’s life 
and to maintain that schedule throughout.  Development time 
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estimates are based on several factors including parallel, 
or like-system development and contractor estimates.  
Department of Defense policy concerning acquisition 
schedule is as follows: 
Schedule parameters shall minimally include (in 
Acquisition Program Baseline (APB)) dates for 
program initiation, major decision points, and 
the attainment of initial operating capability 
(IOC).  The PM may propose, for Milestone 
Decision Authority (MDA) approval, other, 
specific, critical, system events, as necessary. 
(DoD 5000.2-R, 2002, p. 22) 
A program’s risk of experiencing a schedule delay 
is compounded, for example, by the development and 
integration of new technologies, changing requirements and 
budget constraints, among others.  A program unable to 
comply with an approved schedule may risk cancellation. 
d. Cost/Funding Risk 
Without funding, a program has no life.  A 
detailed, total ownership cost (TOC) estimate is required 
upon initiation of a program.  DoD guidelines are specific 
in their direction concerning the establishment of detailed 
cost estimates: 
Cost parameters shall identify TOC (broken-out 
into direct costs: research, development, test, 
and evaluation costs, procurement costs, military 
construction costs, operating and support costs 
(to include environmental, safety, and 
occupational health compliance costs), and the 
costs of acquisition items procured with 
operations and maintenance funds, if applicable.  
Cost figures shall reflect realistic estimates of 
the total program, including a thorough 
assessment of risk. (DoD 5000.2-R, 2002, p. 23) 
A PM clearly needs to provide an accurate, sound 
estimate on the TOC of the program before system 
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development begins.  The risk is the inability to 
accurately predict costs given uncertainty at the outset of 
a program.  The cost risk area is whether a program has 
“the ability to achieve the program’s life cycle cost 
objectives.  This includes the effects of budget and 
affordability decisions and the effects of inherent errors 
in the cost estimating technique(s) used (given that the 
technical requirements were properly defined).” (Defense 
Acquisition University, 2001, p. 8)  
Technical, requirement, schedule and cost/funding 
risks are but a few examples of many risk areas prevalent 
in defense acquisitions.  To summarize the impact of each 
risk area and the interrelatedness of each, the Government 
Accounting Office (GAO) wrote in a report regarding 
acquisition risk: 
Once in a product development environment, 
external pressures to keep the program moving 
(such as preserving cost and schedule estimates 
to secure budget approval) become dominant.  If a 
program manager decided that an additional year 
was needed to reach the desired level of 
technical maturity during the risk 
reduction/concept demonstration phase, the 
planned start of the engineering and 
manufacturing development phase could be delayed.  
This delay could jeopardize funding for that 
phase, thus risking the funding support for the 
entire program. (United States General Accounting 
Office, 2000, p. 16) 
Programs exist because a need or requirement 
exists to better support or equip war fighters.  All the 
numerous risks surrounding a defense acquisition program 
threaten the DoD’s ability to respond to a specific mission 
need or leverage emerging technologies and improve our 
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current war fighting capabilities.  Therefore, it is 
imperative that program managers actively manage and 
mitigate risks in programs.  The next section discusses 
risk management techniques in DoD. 
C. RISK MANAGEMENT 
While risk is the probability of a future event 
occurring and the impact of that event, risk management is 
concerned with “the outcome of future events and how to 
deal with uncertainty.” (Risk Management Guide for DoD 
Acquisition, 2001, p. 1)  Throughout DoD, risk management 
is recognized as a vital management tool that spans the 
entire acquisition lifecycle from concept exploration to 
operations and support. (GSAM, 2000, p. 6-4)  If 
implemented early into a program’s management, risk 
management becomes a way of life.  The key to successfully 
managing risk is planning and forward thinking. 
To support these efforts, assessments should be 
performed as early as possible in the life cycle 
to ensure that critical technical, schedule and 
cost risks are addressed with mitigation actions 
incorporated into program planning and budget 
projections. (Defense Systems Management College, 
2001, p. 2-3)   
The remainder of this section will discuss risk 
management practices and techniques commonly used in DoD. 
This thesis will break down and analyze risk 
management in four parts: (1) Risk Planning, (2) Risk 
Assessment, (3) Risk Mitigation, and (4) Risk Tracking. 
(Defense Acquisition Deskbook (DAD), 2002)  
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Figure 4.   Risk Management Continuum, from (DAU, 
Systems Engineering Fundamentals, 2001). 
 
1. Risk Planning  
Risk planning is the process of “developing and 
documenting an organized, comprehensive and interactive 
strategy and methods for identifying and tracking risk 
areas, developing risk-mitigation plans, performing 
continuous risk assessments to determine how risks have 
changed or what new risk exists.” (GSAM, 2000, p. 6-11)  
Planning for adequate resources is vital to implementing a 
risk management plan throughout the entire lifecycle of the 
program.  The DoD 5000.2-R mandates that PMs include risk 
management in the acquisition strategy.   
Risk planning is a continuous effort throughout the 
life of a program.  Risk planning is not a single event. 
(Systems Engineering Fundamentals, 2001, p. 134)  Init ial 
planning includes “establishing a strategy; establishing 
goals and objectives; planning assessment, handling and 
monitoring activities; identifying resources, tasks and 
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responsibilities and establishing a method to document and 
disseminate information on a continuous basis.” (Systems 
Engineering Fundamentals, 2001, p. 135)  An example Risk 






Risk Management Strategy and Approach 
Organization 





Risk Management Information System, Documentation and Reports  
 
Figure 5.   Risk Management Plan Outline/Format, 
from (Systems Engineering Fundamentals, 2001). 
 
An important aspect of risk planning is the 
identification of shortfalls, whether technical expertise 
or resources.  Identifying shortfalls allows a program 
office to identify risk areas that may require additional 
augmentation or tracking.  The RMP should be fully 
integrated into the program Acquisition Strategy.  Within 
the framework of the Integrated Product and Process 
Development (IPPD) concept, assigning a Risk Management 
Coordinator (RMC) to a program office provides the team a 
focal point for risk management who is res ponsible for 
implementing and supervising the risk management process.  
Once the RMP has addressed the risk management 
strategy and organization, the next step is to identify or 
assess program risks.  The next section will discuss Risk 
Identification/Assessment. 
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2. Risk Identification/Assessment 
Risks can be viewed as opportunities.  “Risk and 
opportunity go hand in hand.  Success cannot be achieved 
without some degree of risk.” (Carnegie Mellon Software 
Engineering Institute (SEI), 1999, p. 3)  Opportunit ies are 
defined as “chances for progress or advancement” or 
“chances for improving the value of the project results.” 
(Forsberg, Mooz, Cotterman, 2000, p. 188)  Programs and 
PM’s risk failure when they fail to identify program risks. 
One of the biggest problems a project manager 
faces is motivating team members to identify 
risks.  You want to make everyone risk conscious.  
However, there is often that hesitancy to surface 
risks, lest one be labeled a worrier or negative 
thinker.  You can’t mitigate it (risk) if you 
don’t know it’s there so it’s better to 
anticipate a lot of problems, some of which won’t 
happen, than too few and miss the “project 
killers.” (Forsberg, Mooz, Cotterman, 2000, p. 
193)  
This section discusses risk identification and 
assessment. 
Risk identification begins by compiling the program’s 
risk events.  Examining each Work Breakdown Structure (WBS) 
product and process element in terms of the sources or 
areas of risk most easily identifies risk events. (Systems 
Engineering Fundamentals, 2001, p. 11) 
A WBS is a “means of organizing system development 
activities by examining the physical and architectural 
qualities of a system.”  (Systems Engineering Fundamentals, 
2001, p. 85)  The WBS enables PM’s to identify potential 
risk areas in development and system integration. 
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Figure 6.   Example Work Breakdown Structure, from 
(Systems Engineering Fundamentals, 2001). 
 
The WBS enables an entire system to be visualized 
through a “logical breakdown of product elements into work 
packages.” (Systems Engineering Fundamentals, 2001, p. 86)  
Once risk areas are identified, a PM needs to categorize 
and prioritize risks elements in the program.   
a. Risk Analysis Process 
Through the IPPD process, program planners, 
engineers, logisticians and other functional area 
representatives discuss and analyze identified risk areas.  
The analysis includes determining the likelihood that a 
risk area will occur and the impact of the occurrence.  
Many tools exist to assist in this process.  A risk matrix 
is a helpful tool to assess risk areas in programs. 
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Figure 7.   Example Risk Matrix, from (GSAM, 2000). 
 
The matrix enables a PMO to individually analyze 
risk areas, determine the likelihood of occurrence and 
assess the impact of the risk on the program’s cost, 
schedule or performance.   
Risk assessments are categorized green, amber or 
red in ascending criticality.  A PMO may elect to pay 
greater attention to amber or red items throughout the risk 
mitigation process than low risk, or “green” risks.  
Critical, or red, risks may be deemed unacceptable to a 
program and generate engineering change proposals (ECP) or 
an aggressive mitigation strategy to reduce the risk to an 
acceptable level.   
The assessments for probability of risk 
occurrence are based on program office personnel 
experience, similar or parallel system development, 
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modeling and simulation, like-component mean time to 
failure and technology maturity, among others.  The risk 
impact assessment is similarly determined.  The following 
provides examples of risk impact determination criteria: 
· Comparisons with similar systems, 
· Relevant lessons-learned studies, 
· Experience, 
· Results from tests and prototype development, 
· Data from engineering or other models, 
· Specialist and expert judgments, 
· Analysis of plans and related documents, 
· Modeling and simulation, 
· Sensitivity of analysis of alternatives. (Risk 
Management Guide for DoD Acquisition, 2001, p. 
15) 
Once the risk area probabilities and impacts are 
determined, the risks may be prioritized and rated based on 
greatest probability of occurrence and impact to the 
program. 
b. Risk Rating and Prioritization 
Risk ratings are indications of potential impact 
of risks on a program.  Risks are often rated and 
categorized as High, Moderate or Low.  Risk ratings and 
prioritization are considered an integral part of risk 
analysis.  Prioritizing risks is the first step in 
developing a risk mitigation strategy, focusing efforts 
first on risks that carry the greatest potential impact on 
the program.  Several tools exist to assist the PMO to make 
preliminary judgments regarding risk classification. 
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Figure 8.   Example Risk Classification Matrix, 
from (Systems Engineering Fundamentals, 2001). 
 
The documented, prioritization is called a risk 
Watch List. (Risk Management Guide for DoD Acquisition, 
2001, p. 17)  A prioritized watch lists allows the PMO to 
visualize risk areas and concentrate management and 
leadership efforts where they are most needed. 
 
 
Figure 9.   Example Risk Rating Matrix, from (Risk 
Management Guide for DoD Acquisition, 2001). 
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Based on identified risk areas and their 
probability of occurrence and impact to the program, the 
PMO can develop a mitigation strategy. 
 
 
Figure 10.   Initial Risk Identification and 
Prioritization, from (Risk Management Guide for 
DoD Acquisition, 2001). 
 
3. Risk Mitigation 
Risk mitigation is the process that “identifies, 
evaluates, selects, and implements options in order to set 
risk at acceptable levels given program constraints and 
objectives.” (GSAM, 2000, p. 6-19)  Risk mitigation 
includes determining what should be done to manage a 
particular risk, how often it should be done and reported, 
who is responsible for handling it and what the cost impact 
of managing the risk is.  PM’s must determine the possible 
“consequences of action or inaction as well as conducting a 
cost-benefit analysis of mitigation actions.” (GSAM, 2000, 
p. 6-20)  Risk mitigation actions should also be closely 
tied to metrics that measure the success, progress or 
failure of a particular mitigation action. 
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A program’s RMC has several options regarding risk 
handling.  RMCs may assess risk mitigation proposals based 
on the following criteria: 
· Can the option be feasibly implemented and still 
meet the user’s needs? 
· What is the expected effectiveness of the 
handling option in reducing program risk to an 
acceptable level? 
· Is the option affordable; based on both fiscal 
and time constraints? 
· What effect, if any, does the option have on the 
system’s technical performance? (Risk Management 
Guide for DoD Acquisition, 2001, p. 19) 
Based on the assessments, the PMO may choose among 
several risk mitigation (i.e. handling) techniques. 
a. Risk Avoidance 
A PMO may avoid a risk of one alternative by 
choosing another, less risky alternative.  This process is, 
in essence, a method to reduce risk since it does not 
completely eliminate risk.  An important distinction to 
make is that risk avoidance must be a conscious decision to 
choose lower versus higher risk options.  Avoiding risk by 
ignoring its presence and potential impact is an 
unacceptable solution. 
Risk avoidance may be done in parallel with “the 
up-front requirements analysis, supported by a cost per 
requirement trade study.  The concept of Cost as an 
Independent Variable (CAIV) is an example of such a study.  
It is imperative that user representatives are present 
during any trade-off study or decision.” (Risk Management 
Guide for DoD Acquisition, 2001, p. 20) 
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Risk cannot be altogether avoided.  Remembering 
that a risk represents an opportunity, risk aversion can 
lead to a poor managerial environment. 
A risk-averse culture inhibits risk management 
more than does the lack of a management 
infrastructure or a repeatable method.  Such a 
culture generally rewards crisis management and 
punishes those who identify why the project may 
not succeed. (GSAM, 2000, p. 6-19) 
It is evident that the avoidance of one risk in 
favor of another, less-risky alternative is not the same as 
attempting to eliminate risk from a program altogether.   
b. Risk Control 
Risk may be controlled through the continuous 
monitoring and correction of risky conditions.  Risk 
control “monitors and manages the risk in a way that 
reduces the probability and impact of its occurrence on the 
program.” (Risk Management Guide for DoD Acquisition, 2001, 
p. 19)  Risk control involves reviews, inspections, risk 
milestone reviews, development of fallback positions and 
similar management techniques.  Controlling risk involves 
“developing a risk reduction plan and then tracking to that 
plan.” (GSAM, 2000, p. 6-20)  The following lists examples 
of risk control actions: 
· Multiple development efforts 
· Alternative designs 
· Early prototyping 
· Incremental development 
· Technology maturation efforts. 
· Use of mock-ups, and 
· Modeling and simulation (Risk Management Guide 
for DoD Acquisition, 2001, p. 19-20) 
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While this is not an exhaustive list, it provides 
examples of risk control actions while, again, not 
eliminating risk.  All of these methods reduce unnecessary 
risks while working to meet user requirements. 
c. Risk Assumption 
Risk assumption involves a conscious decision to 
accept a risk level and potential impact of occurrence 
without taking any steps to manage or reduce the risk.  The 
challenge for PMs lies in determining an acceptable level 
of risk.  Risk assumption is best reserved for low-level 
risks, in terms of impact, or risks whose probability of 
occurrence is remote.  Whenever possible, PMOs will handle 
risk assumptions by ensuring that a contingency plan is in 
place to address and handle emerging risks previously 
assumed in the program.  A management reserve, additional 
funds, personnel or schedule time, must be in place to  
accomplish contingency management actions. (Risk Management 
Guide for DoD Acquisition, 2001, p. 21) 
d. Risk Transference 
Risk transference involves more than one entity 
sharing risk, which is often cost risk.  This technique is 
frequently used between the Government and contractors.  
The Government provides a contractor financial incentives 
(award fees, contractual incentives), for example, to share 
in managing risk.  A contract between the Government and a 
prime contractor generally initiates the risk transference 
process.  The Government may provide financial incentives 
to a prime contractor to minimize or reduce risks in 
numerous risk areas to include system technical 
performance, development cost and adherence to schedule.  
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This thesis discusses risk transference through the 
contracting process in subsequent chapters.  
4. Risk Tracking/Monitoring 
Risk monitoring is the continuous process of “tracking 
and evaluating the risk management process by metric 
reporting, enterprise feedback on watch list items and 
regular enterprise input on potential developing risk 
areas.” (Systems Engineering Fundamentals, 2001, p. 139)  
The process involves evaluating how current and past risk 
handling actions compare with previously established risk 
management metrics.  Program metrics are used for formal 
analyses of how well the various development processes are 
progressing in comparison to TPMs, schedule predictions, 
technology maturity, etc.   
The purpose of monitoring and tracking risk is two-
fold.  First, to determine if risk elements are in danger 
of adversely affecting cost, schedule or performance of the 
program.  Second, risk monitoring aids in identifying risk 
areas not initially identified and assessed.  The “Goal, 
Question, Metric paradigm” (GQM) is a simple example of the 
risk tracking/monitoring process. (GSAM, 2001, p. 6-21) 
The GQM method consists of the following steps.  The 
first step is to select the goals of the risk area-
monitoring program.  The second step is to identify “the 
questions that should be asked to determine if the goals 
are being met.” (GSAM, 2001, p. 6-21)  The final step is to 
identify metrics or indicators that allow one to answer the 
question, “Are the goals being met?” (GSAM, 2001, p. 6-21)  
The final step in the risk tracking/monitoring process 
is to document the findings.  A program office-wide shared 
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database allows all PMO personnel to update risk area 
progress and emergent threats in the program.  
Documentation “provides the basis for program assessments 
and updates as the program progresses.” (Risk Management 
Guide for DoD Acquisition, 2001, p. 21)  Proper risk 
documentation also helps to incorporate new personnel into 
the program office and reduces the hazard of repeating past 
mistakes.  Depending on the technical depth and size of a 
program, PMs will establish a standard list of risk 
documentation to be presented at established intervals.  
The following list illustrates example reports: 
· Program metrics 
· Technical reports 
· Earned Value (EV) reports 
· Watch list 
· Schedule performance report 
· Critical risk process reports (Risk Management 
Guide for DoD Acquisition, 2001, p. 22) 
The above list provides examples of reports that may be used to 
document the implementation of the RMP to assess its successes 
or shortfalls.  The next section will analyze several techniques 
that DoD can use to manage risk in developmental systems. 
D. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RISK MANAGEMENT TECHNIQUES 
Many risk management techniques are available to the 
DoD.  The DoD 5000.2-R requires PMs to ensure that 
contractors’ management information systems used in 
“planning and controlling contract performance meet the 
Earned Value Management Systems (EVMS) guidelines.” (DoD 
5000.2-R, p. 49)  The Program Milestone Decision Authority 
(MDA) may waive the requirement, in some instances.  Other 
than EVMS, no particular risk management technique is 
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mandatory in DoD.  This section discusses several risk 
management options available to PMs.   
1. Test and Evaluation (T&E) 
Periodic Test and Evaluation (T&E) events early and 
throughout a program’s development are a method of 
evaluating the progress and technological maturity of a 
system and identifying new risk areas.  A test plan is a 
risk reduction method if implemented early.  The T&E 
process is “an integral part of the systems engineering 
process which identifies levels of performance and assists 
the developer in correcting deficiencies.” (Test and 
Evaluation Management Guide, 2001, p. 1-1)   
T&E is an important risk management technique because 
it helps developers and managers evaluate levels of 
technical performance, reliability, maintainability, 
technical maturity and cost and schedule conformance.  T&E 
is a proactive measure that validates earned levels of 
performance and identifies emerging risks so they may be 
managed and tracked: 
Correcting defects in weapons has been estimated 
to add from 10-30% to the cost of each item.  
Such costly redesign and modification efforts can 
be reduced if carefully planned and executed test 
and evaluation programs are used to detect and 
fix system deficiencies.” (Test and Evaluation 
Management Guide, 2001, p. 1-1) 
T&E, though often costly and time-consuming to 
perform, has the potential to help control costs and ensure 
a desired level of system performance in the long run of 
the program.  Figure 11 illustrates the relationship 
between committing program dollars to thoroughly test and 
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evaluate the system incrementally throughout its life and 
the life-cycle cost of the system. 
 
 
Figure 11.   Life-Cycle-Cost Decision Impact and 
Expenditures, from (Test and Evaluation 
Management Guide, 2001). 
 
The figure demonstrates that a system that is not 
properly tested early during its life cycle may incur far 
greater Operations and Support (O&S) costs than a system 
that undergoes a thorough T&E plan to identify and manage 
risks early throughout system development and demonstration 
(SDD). 
T&E also serves as a decision-making tool for senior 
leaders in DoD.  T&E events are required before a system 
can undergo a Milestone Review.  Figure 12 illustrates the 
relationship between T&E and the Acquisition Process. 
The Test and Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP) is written 
as a part of the formal Acquisition Strategy pending a 
Milestone B decision authorizing entry into System 
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Development & Demonstration (SDD).  The TEMP addresses 
system items to be tested as well as laying out the 
Integrated Test Program (ITP) Schedule.  The TEMP is 
updated continuously throughout the program and officially 
at each Acquisition Milestone.   
 
 
Figure 12.   Testing and the Acquisition Process, 
from (Test and Evaluation Management Guide, 
2001). 
 
The TEMP updates include guidance from the MDA on 
testing areas of interest during the follow-on acquisition 
phase.  Testing areas focus on validating system 
capabilities and detecting and reporting of “deficiencies 
that may adversely impact the performance capability or 
availability/supportability of a system.” (Test and 
Evaluation Management Guide, 2001, p. 1-4) 
In summary, T&E is “the discipline that helps to 
illuminate risk areas of vulnerability.” (Test and 
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Evaluation Management Guide, 2001, p. 1-7)  A rigorous T&E 
program can identify and manage program risks in a manner 
that saves time and money, while also ensuring that the 
tester provides the user timely and cost effective answers 
to operational requirements. 
2. Cost as an Independent Variable (CAIV) 
Cost as an Independent Variable (CAIV) is the process 
of balancing cost, schedule, performance and risk early in 
a systems development in order to manage a program to a 
cost objective.” (Risk Management Guide for DoD 
Acquisition, 2001, p. 29)  CAIV involves a joint PMO-user 
representative trade-off analysis between system 
performance and program costs.  The underlying premise of 
CAIV is that “if costs are too great, and there are ways to 
reduce them, then the user and developer may reduce 
performance requirements to meet cost objectives.” (Risk 
Management Guide for DoD Acquisition, 2001, p. 30)  Risk 
assessments are essential in the CAIV trade-off process. 
Assessing risk areas and identifying cost drivers 
provide PMs and user representatives with data that can be 
used when conducting trade-offs between system performance 
and cost.  The concept of CAIV is that “equal emphasis must 
be placed on managing cost and schedule risks” as it is on 
system technical risk. (Risk Management Guide for DoD 
Acquisition, 2001, p. 30) 
3. Earned Value Management (EVM) 
The Earned Value Management System (EVMS) is a joint 
DoD-Industry agreement established in 1995 that details DoD 
5000.2-R contractor requirements with respect to the 
implementation of Earned Value Management (EVM).  EVM is a 
process that, through one hundred percent system 
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decomposition and definition, evaluates a program’s 
progress in terms of cost and schedule.  EVM can be used as 
an “early warning signal” to a PM to identify risks of 
overrunning cost or schedule constraints. (Earned Value 
Project Management, September 2002)   
By decomposing a system’s requirements and defining 
the system thoroughly, managers can provide cost estimates 
per development function and track the program’s progress.  
PMs periodically assess actual costs to date versus 
projected costs and actual time requirements versus 
projected time to determine variances.  The identification 
of variance can help identify new or underestimated risk 
areas and alert the PM to take action to assess and 
mitigate the cost or schedule risks.  Figure 13 illustrates 
that a program’s progress may be evaluated after only 15% 
completion of the program.  
The key to using EVM effectively is an accurate 
program process definition and decomposition.  When u sed 
properly, EVM affords a PM visibility on a program’s cost 
and schedule status.  The PM can then make necessary 
changes or perform trade-off studies to meet cost and 
schedule thresholds.  EVM is an effective technique to 
combat cost and schedule risks. 
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Figure 13.   Earned Value Management As a Risk 
Management Technique, from (Earned Value Project 
Management, September 2002). 
 
4. Modeling and Simulation 
Modeling and simulation (M&S) may be used by a PMO to 
manage risk throughout the entire life cycle of a system.  
Models and simulations can “reduce time, resources, and 
acquisition risk” and may contribute to increasing the 
system’s overall quality and performance. (Risk Management 
Guide for DoD Acquisition, 2001, p. 27)  In managing risk, 
M&S can assist in the following ways: 
· Develop alternate concepts during system design 
· Predict performance in support of trade-off 
studies 
· Evaluate system design and support preliminary  
design reviews 
· Predict performance and supplement live tests 
during system testing 
· Examine the military value of the item 
· Determine the impact of design changes 
· Hone requirements 
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· Develop life-cycle support requirements and 
assessments (Risk Management Guide for DoD 
Acquisition, 2001, p. 27) 
The risk management techniques this thesis has 
addressed are not mutually exclusive.  For, example M&S may 
be used extensively during T&E.   
Modeling and Simulation during T&E may be used for 
“concept evaluation, extrapolation, isolation of design 
effects, efficiency, representation of complex environments 
and overcoming inherent limitations in actual testing.” 
(Test and Evaluation Management Guide, 2001, p. 14-8)  By 
performing M&S during T&E, the PM may thoroughly test a 
system under virtual conditions and environments, which may 
otherwise be cost-prohibitive.  M&S helps to reduce 
technical risk by discovering design effects on the overall 
system before physically incorporated into the system.  M&S 
reduces schedule and cost risk by assisting engineers to 
make the right decisions early based on data gathered 
during M&S tests.  Additionally, models, which prove to be 
accurate predictors of actual test events may allow the PM 
to waive further, live tests based on a high degree of 
confidence in the model’s data. 
Modeling and Simulation is only as good as the data 
and variables that are inputs to the model.  M&S can be a 
great risk management tool if adequate time is taken to 
ensure the accuracy of input data.  The DoD 5000.2-R 
encourages PMs to incorporate M&S activities where 
applicable to their respective programs because of the 
potential cost and time reductions as well as enhanced 
system development and performance validation. 
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5. Including Risk Management in the Contracting 
Process 
The final risk management technique this thesis 
addresses is the inclusion of risk management throughout 
the contracting process.  Managing risk through contracting 
often involves risk transference from either the Government 
to the contractor or vice versa.  “By properly setting the 
expectations of all players, explicitly agreeing upon the 
deliverable items produced by the event, and securing 
sponsorship from project management, a high degree of 
success is assured.” (SEI, 1999, p. 17)  The shift from 
Military Specifications and Standards to Performance based 
requirements placed increased risk in the hands of the 
contractor.  However, “if a program fails because risk 
isn’t managed well by the contractor, the PM is ultimately 
responsible.” (Defense Acquisition Deskbook (DAD), Top 
Eleven Ways to Manage Technical Risk, 1998, p. 3 -1)  
Numerous opportunities exist throughout the contracting 
process that enables the Government to manage system risk.  
The remainder of this section discusses risk management  
through the Request for Proposal (RFP) and contract award 
fee incentives. 
a. The Request for Proposal (RFP) 
Even before an RFP is released, a PM should 
conduct a preliminary risk assessment to ensure that “the 
program to be described in the RFP is executa ble within 
technical, schedule and budget constraints.” (DAD, Top 
Eleven Ways to Manage Technical Risk, 1998,  p. 3-1)  The 
RFP should require offerors to address their RMP and 
initial risk assessment and mitigation plan for moderate to 
high-risk areas. (DAD, Top Eleven Ways to Manage Technical 
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Risk, 1998, p. 3-1)  The RFP should also stipulate that 
offerors must make periodic risk assessment reports to the 
Government.  Contractors’ reports serve as input to the 
PM’s risk monitoring and tracking program.  By requiring a 
risk-based approach, offerors’ proposals should “state how 
they would plan and schedule [software] activities based 
upon realistic assessments of technical challenges and 
risks” so that the Government may evaluate management 
capabilities.” (GSAM, 2000, p. 6-30)  Whether the 
development risk is hardware, software or a combination of 
both, the RFP is a vehicle to inject risk management 
activities into the program.  The RFP contains several 
sections, which allow the Government to directly address 
risk areas in the solicitation. 
Section C, Description/Specifications/Statement 
of Work, includes any descriptions or specifications 
required in the offeror’s response. (DAD, Top Eleven Ways 
to Manage Technical Risk, 1998, p. 3-2)  Example Section C 
wording that addresses risk is as follows: 
The Offeror shall describe its proposed risk 
management program.  The Offeror shall describe 
how they intend to identify, assess, mitigate, 
and monitor potential technical risks.  Critical 
technical risks which may adversely impact cost, 
schedule, or performance shall be identified 
along with proposed risk mitigation methods for 
all risks identified as moderate or high." (DAD, 
Top Eleven Ways to Manage Technical Risk, 1998, 
p. 3-2)   
Section C allows the Government to evaluate 
offerors’ RMPs and compare competing contractors’ responses 
with respect to risk identification, assessment and 
handling.  The contractor’s detailed Statement of Work 
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(SOW) submitted in response to the RFP can inform the 
Government as to the level of contractor requirement 
understanding.  The SOW may also warn PMOs of high-risk 
acquisition plans on the part of the contractor.  
Section L, Instructions, Conditions, and Notices 
to Offerors, provides instructions to the offeror in 
proposal preparation.  The Government may elect to include 
risk management requirements in Section L as long as the 
risk items are consistent throughout the RFP.  Example 
Section L language is as follows: 
The Offeror shall discuss past/present 
performance in the implementation of risk 
reduction/mitigation efforts similar to those 
proposed for the reduction of all risks 
identified as moderate or high.” (DAD, Top Eleven 
Ways to Manage Technical Risk, 1998, p. 3-2) 
Section L ensures that offerors include 
information pertaining to risk that may enable the 
Government to evaluate a contractor’s technical past 
performance or ability to manage technical risk. 
Section M, Evaluation Factors for Award, notifies 
offerors of “the evaluation factors against which all 
proposals will be evaluated.” (DAD, Top Eleven Ways to 
Manage Technical Risk, 1998, p. 3-2)  Section M should 
focus on areas outlined for offerors in Section L so that 
the Government’s instructions for proposal preparation are 
consistent with the evaluation criteria.  Section M should 
list the relative importance or hierarchy of evaluation 
criteria such as past performance, risk management, 
technical performance, cost, schedule, management, etc.  
The Government is not required to quantify the importance 
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or ranking of evaluation criteria, but must inform offerors 
which criteria will be considered most in the source 
selection process.  An example Section M risk management 
language follows: 
The Government will evaluate the Offeror’s 
proposed risk management program and plans for 
identifying, assessing, mitigating, and 
monitoring risks, as well as proposed plans for 
mitigating those risks identified as moderate or 
high." (DAD, Top Eleven Ways to Manage Technical 
Risk, 1998, p. 3-3) 
Through specific risk management Section L 
instructions and corresponding Section M evaluation 
criteria, the Government can ensure that only proposals 
that demonstrate responsible and capable risk area handling 
are considered for contract award.   
The DoD 5000.2-R states that risk reduction 
through the use of mature technology will be a significant 
factor in the Source Selection Process (SSP).  The purpose 
of the SSP and competition in contracting is to “select the 
contractor whose performance can be expected to meet the 
Government’s requirements at an affordable price.” (DAD, 
Top Eleven Ways to Manage Technical Risk, 1998, p. 3 -4)  
Several vehicles, including the detailed Statement of Work 
(SOW), aid the PM in evaluating solicitation respondents.    
b. Statement of Objectives (SOO) 
The Statement of Objectives (SOO) is a concept 
that transfers the responsibility for preparing the 
Statement of Work (SOW) from the Government to the offeror. 
(DAD, Top Eleven Ways to Manage Technical Risk, 1998, p. 3-
3)  The SOO is the “primary document for translating 
performance requirements into contractual tasks.” (GSAM, 
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2000, p. 8-9)  The SOO encompasses top-level objectives and 
allows offerors greater flexibility and creativity in 
responding with SOWs that are more detailed.  SOOs are 
intended to not limit contractors by imposing restrictive 
specifications.  
Having offerors prepare SOWs is intended to 
reduce costs and time previously spent by the Government.  
The SOO may inform offerors of the Government’s objective 
of identifying, assessing, handling and tracking risk 
areas.  Contractors may respond with detailed RMPs or risk 
assessment methodologies in the SOWs contained in their 
proposals.  If identified in Section M, offerors’ risk 
management methodology contained in the SOW may be used as 
evaluation criteria during the SSP. 




Figure 14.   RFP Preparation Process, from (GSAM, 
2000). 
 
c. Risk Management Based Award Fees During 
Contract Administration  
The process of selecting a contract type is based 
on many factors.  The contractor’s technical ability, 
urgency of the program or the type and complexity of the 
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program are all examples of contract type decision 
criteria.  Providing incentives for contractors to identify 
and handle risks through Contract Award Fees can be a 
valuable technique for the Government in systems 
acquisition risk management.   
Award Fee determinations may be based on analysis 
of offerors’ SOWs and “identification of critical areas of 
program risk.” (DAD, Top Eleven Ways to Manage Technical 
Risk, 1998, p. 3-5)  Moderate to high-risk areas are 
generally good candidates for award fees because they 
encourage the contractor to focus specific attention on 
areas whose potential impact to the program is highest.  
Tying award fees to risk areas identified as moderate to 
high risk ensures both Government and contractor attention 
and communication.  Award fee discussion between the 
Government and the Prime Contractor should be held 
regularly.  Award fee discussions should be held quarterly 
or even monthly to ensure continuous performance feedback 
for the contractor.  This process facilitates open and 
frequent communication between the PMO and the Contractor 
and ensures that risk management is a continuous process 
that requires constant attention. 
In order to administer an award fee type 
contract, contractor performance and award fee criteria 
must be clearly articulated and measurable.  Award fee 
periods are often tied to specific events such as 
Developmental Test and Evaluation (DT&E) events or 
Operational Test and Evaluation (OT&E) events where the 
contractor has an opportunity to demonstrate achieved 
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technological maturity or system integration.  Award fees 
may be incorporated into several contract types. 
A Cost Plus Award Fee (CPAF) type contract is a 
“cost reimbursable contract that provides for a fee 
consisting of a base amount fixed at inception of the 
contract and an award fee amount that the contractor may 
earn in whole or in part during performance.” (Bonneville 
Purchasing Instructions, 1998, p. 7-7)  The program cost 
estimate is determined during Government-Contractor 
negotiations.  An Award Fee Plan (AFP) is agreed to upon 
inception of the contract.  The AFP lays out award fee 
periods as well as award criteria. 
The Government must provide the Prime Contractor 
with frequent feedback concerning contractor performance 
before it can award, reduce or withhold an award fee.  This 
enables the PMO and the contractor to communicate 
regularly, and openly, concerning the progress of the 
program and the status of the program risk handling.  
Including risk management as part of award fee criteria is 
a method of transferring risk from the Government to the 
contractor. 
E. SUMMARY   
This chapter first defined risk and risk management in 
the DoD environment.  Risk is the probability of an event 
occurring and the likely impact that event has on the 
outcome of a program.  Risk management involves the 
identification, assessment, mitigation and finally the 
tracking and documentation of risk areas within a program. 
Several categories of risk, or risk areas exist in DoD 
acquisition.  A program’s success is based on the system’s 
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ability to achieve desired performance characteristics 
within cost and schedule constraints.  Risk areas, whether 
technical, management or requirements can adversely affect 
a program’s ability to comply with cost and schedule 
constraints and still meet expected performance 
characteristics. 
Finally, this chapter discussed risk management 
techniques commonly used in DoD systems acquisition.  It 
introduced T&E, EVM, M&S, CAIV and the contracting process 
as areas with potential for managing risks.  
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III. THE ADVANCED AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT VEHICLE (AAAV) 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This section provides background information on the 
Marine Corps’ Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAAV).  
Subsequent chapters provide analysis of the AAAV program’s 
risk management techniques during the Program Definition 
and Risk Reduction (PDRR) Acquisition Phase.  A Milestone 
III review is planned for FY 2007. 
B. AAAV HISTORY 
The Marine Corps has had an amphibian vehicle since 
1941. (Lissner and Dees, March 2002)  Its presence in the 
Marine Corps arsenal has personified the Marines’ 
amphibious assault capability.  The necessity for fighting 
effectively in the littorals has continued to validate the 
requirement.  But, by 1992, the currently fielded AAV had 
surpassed its planned 10-year service life by twenty years.   
Three, separate Mission Area Analyses (MAA) were 
conducted to determine the AAV’s mission effectiveness and 
suitability.  The result was the determination that the AAV 
was deficient in mobility (land and water), firepower, 
survivability and command and control. (AAAV DRPM, Program 
Overview, October 2002)  The Center for Naval Analyses 
(CNA) conducted an AOA to examine alternatives for the 
Marine Corps and its amphibious assault capability. 
(Lissner and Dees, March 2002) 
The CNA presented thirteen different system solutions 
to the Marine Corps’ needs.  The alternatives ranged from 
amphibian, swimming vehicles to Landing Craft, Air Cushion 
(LCAC) loaded Bradley Fighting Vehicles.  Following the 
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CNA’s AOA, the Marine Corps Combat Development Command 
(MCCDC) conducted a supplemental analysis in 1995.  The 
analysis yielded a “hands down” decision to pursue a “fast-
swimming amphibian.” (Lissner and Dees, March 2002)  The 
criteria for analysis was based on cost, performance, 
mission effectiveness and total life cycle cost of the 
system. 
Following the 1995 AOA, the AAAV program entered 
Program Development and Risk Reduction (PDRR).  The AAAV 
reached a Milestone II review in September 2000.  A 
subsequent AOA was conducted following PDRR to determine 
the validity of the proposed concept and its projected 
costs (acquisition and life cycle), performance, and 
mission effectiveness.   
 
Figure 15.   The Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle 
(AAAV), from (FAS, Military Analysis Network, 
October 2002). 
 
The analysis determined that the AAAV was, in fact, 
the system that the Marine Corps needed to overcome 
existing operational deficiencies of the AAV.  The AAAV 
passed the Milestone II review in November 2000 and entered 
the System Development and Demonstration (SDD) phase.  The 
AAAV is currently in SDD as of early 2003. (Lissner and 
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Dees, March 2002) (AAAV DRPM, Program Overview, October 
2002) 
The AAAV prime contractor is General Dynamics 
Amphibious Systems (GDAS).  Its subcontractors and 
respective subsystem are: 
· MTU: Engine 
· Allison: Transmission and gear boxes 
· Honeywell: Water jets 
· Ball: Antenna 
· CDC: Communications (AAAV DRPM, Program Overview, 
October 2002)   
The SDD contract calls for the production and testing 
of nine prototypes prior to the Low Rate Initial Production 
(LRIP) decision.  As of October 2002, three prototypes have 
been tested in varying terrain and under different 
operational conditions.   
Prototype #1 achieved the High Water Speed Key 
Performance Parameter (KPP) in April 2000 by reaching a 
maximum waterborne speed of 38 knots.  Prototype #2 has 
conducted significant land mobility testing.  The vehicle 
achieved Troop Carrying and Land Speed KPPs during 2000.  
The third prototype has undergone extensive land, water and 
mobility developmental testing including Early Operational 
Assessment (EOA) in 2001. (AAAV DRPM, Program Overview, 
October 2002)  In the fall of 2002, the AAAV performed 
shipboard launch, recovery and interoperability testing.   
C. AAAV CHARACTERISTICS 
The Marine Corps is developing the AAAV in response to 
noted operational deficiencies in the currently fielded 
Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAV).  The AAAV’s mission is to 
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“provide high speed transport of embarked Marine Infantry 
from ships located beyond the horizon to inland 
objectives.” (AAAV DRPM, Program Overview, October 2002)  
The AAAV will provide Marine forces with an enhanced 
capability to conduct ship-to-shore movement and greater 
mobility and speed once ashore.  The AAAV’s range, speed 
and enhanced survivability will provide commanders with a 
“Multiple Options/Late Decision Capability.” (AAAV DRPM, 
Program Overview, October 2000)  The following table 





AAAV Requirement AAV Capability 
Water Speed 23-29 MPH 6-8 MPH 
Cross-country 
land speed 
45 MPH (keep pace with 
main battle tank) 
15-20 MPH 
Range on water 65 miles 45 miles 







Survivability (1) 4.5mm round w/out 
enhanced armor plating 
(1) 4.5 mm round 
with enhanced armor 
plating 
NBC Protection Overpressure System 







Defeat light armored 
combat vehicle of 
2005-2025 time frame 





vehicle with 40mm 
and .50 cal weaponry 
 
Table 1.   AAAV and AAV Capability Comparison, 
from (Military Analysis Network/AAAV, October 
2002 and General Dynamics Land Systems, October 
2002). 
 
  49 
The enhanced capability the AAAV provides the Navy and 
the Marine Corps is the ability to conduct Operational 
Maneuver From the Sea (OMFTS).  Littoral regions previously 
denying maneuver forces of options will become maneuver 
areas and avenues of approach.  The AAAV will extend the 
Marine Corps’ “operational reach.” (AAAV DRPM, Program 
Overview, October 2002)  
D. AAAV ACQUISITION AND PROCUREMENT 
The AAAV is the only ACAT ID program managed by the 
Marine Corps.  The AAAV program office is unique as the 
Government and the prime contractor, GDAS, share the same 
facility in Woodbridge, Virginia.   
The Marine Corps will buy one thousand and thirteen 
(1,013) AAAVs to replace the AAV at a cost of nearly $7.6 
Billion.  The AAAV’s Initial Operating Capability (IOC) is 
scheduled for 2008 with full fielding of the system 
beginning in 2012. (Military Analysis Network, 2002, p. 2)  
Figure 16 depicts the AAAV’s program schedule as of October 
2002. 
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Figure 16.   AAAV Program Schedule, from (AAAV 
Direct Reporting Program Manager (DRPM), October 
2002). 
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IV. THE ADVANCED AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT VEHICLE (AAAV) 
RISK MANAGEMENT STRATEGY DURING PROGRAM DEFINITION 
AND RISK REDUCTION (PDRR) 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents the research methodology this 
author uses to address the primary and subsidiary research 
questions.  The objective of this chapter is to provide 
data and information pertaining to the Advanced Amphibious 
Assault Vehicle’s (AAAV) Program Definition and Risk 
Reduction (PDRR) Phase risk management strategy. 
The AAAV Program Management Office (PMO) is employing 
several risk management (RM) techniques during the System 
Development and Demonstration (SDD) Acquisition Phase.  The 
next chapter analyzes the lessons learned from the PDRR 
risk management strategy and how the lessons learned are 
helping to shape the risk management process during SDD.   
B. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
In order to obtain background information to answer 
the subsidiary thesis questions, the author conducted a 
thorough Internet search of Department of Defense (DoD) 
directives, manuals, guidelines, presentations, handbooks 
and reports as well as private sector risk management 
related sites.  Additionally, the author conducted a 
literary search.  The sources used in the presentation of 
the research included newspaper and magazine articles, 
books, trade journals and other library information 
resources.  The author visited the AAAV Direct Reporting 
Program Management Office (DRPM) in Woodbridge, VA to 
conduct interviews with both Government and Prime 
Contractor program leadership and observe risk management 
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practices in use during SDD.  The latter methodology 
provided great insight into the current DoD risk management 
environment.  
The majority of AAAV specific, PDRR and SDD Risk 
Management practices discussed in this thesis came from 
interviews with AAAV PMO department heads.  The author 
interviewed the System Test Officer, the Senior System 
Engineer, the Deputy Director of Program Planning and 
Integration (PP&I) (also the Risk Management Coordinator), 
the System Chief Information Officer (CIO), and a support 
contractor charged with consulting on matters of risk.  In 
addition to Government program office personnel, the author 
interviewed the General Dynamics Amphibious Systems (GDAS) 
Risk Coordinator (Program Planning Integrating IPT), 
Assistant Risk Coordinator, and a Quality Assurance 
Engineer.  
C. OBJECTIVE OF RESEARCH 
The objective of the research is to collect, decipher 
and present information and facts that lead to the analysis 
and discussion of DoD risk management practices.  The 
vehicle for this presentation and analysis of data was a 
case study of the AAAV.  The primary and subsidiary thesis 
questions are re-stated below: 
1. Primary 
· How have the lessons learned from the AAAV’s 
Program Definition and Risk Reduction (PDRR) Risk 
Management Strategy impacted the Program’s Risk 
Management Process during System Development and 
Demonstration (SDD)? 
2. Subsidiary 
· What are risk and risk management in Department 
of Defense (DoD) systems acquisition? 
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· What techniques can DoD use to manage risk in 
developmental systems? 
· What is the AAAV program? 
· What are the lessons learned from the AAAV PDRR 
Risk Management Strategy?   
· What risk management approaches has the AAAV 
Program Office adopted to manage technical and 
programmatic risk during SDD?  
· What conclusions and recommendations can be drawn 
from this analysis? 
Chapters II and III answered the first three 
subsidiary questions.  This chapter presents data for the 
purpose of addressing AAAV risk management techniques 
during PDRR.  Subsequent chapters address the remaining 
questions and conclude by answering the primary research 
question and providing conclusions and recommendations. 
D. AAAV RISK MANAGEMENT TECHNIQUES DURING PROGRAM 
DEFINITION AND RISK REDUCTION (PDRR) 
This section addresses the following risk management 
techniques employed in the Advanced Amphibious Assault 
Vehicle (AAAV) Program during PDRR: 
· Information Technology Tools 
· The Joint Government-General Dynamics Risk 
Management and Resolution Process 
· Contracting  
· Government and Prime Contractor Co-Location and 
the IPPD process 
· Test and Evaluation 
1. Information Technology Tools 
The AAAV Team (Government and General Dynamics 
Amphibious Systems (GDAS)) utilized robust information 
technology tools to assist in the management of the program 
during PDRR.  Information sharing within organizational 
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departments and especially across functional areas was 
crucial to the program’s successful risk management 
approach.  The AAAV Team leveraged many tools and 
processes.  This section discusses the Virtual Design 
Database (VDD) and the Virtual Integration and Assembly 
(VINTEGRA) systems. 
a. Virtual Design Database (VDD) 
The Virtual Design Database (VDD) is a tool that 
provides users with a virtual, integrated environment.  
Accessible to both Government and GDAS personnel at any 
desk or lap top computer, the VDD consists of user-
friendly, windows-based electronic documents sorted by 
Integrated Product Teams (IPT) and aligned by the Work 
Breakdown Structure (WBS).  The VDD “consists of various 
distributed databases linked together via high speed 
network connections.” (Integrated Digital Environment 
(IDE), October 2002)  IPT areas include Modeling and 
Simulation, Systems Engineering, Logistics, Mobility 
Products, Firepower Products, Integration and Assembly, 
etc.  The VDD “provides AAAV IPT members with an on-line, 
real time, paperless communication system used to logically 
file and provide access to AAAV program documentation.” 
(IDE, October 2002)  
The VDD has the following characteristics: 
· Makes data available to all members, USMC, 
Government, and the subcontractors from a desktop 
platform 
· Provides desktop 3-D Visualization and solid 
model capability 
· Stores data in all electronic formats 
· Permits a document author or IPT lead to edit the 
document 
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· Integrated e-mail system 
· Fully integrated with other PC applications. 
(IDE, October 2002) 
VDD’s personal computer interface resembles a 
Work Breakdown Structure (WBS) format.  Drop-down windows 
allow users to search files by IPTs.  Risk Management is 
facilitated through features, or capabilities, built into 
the VDD.  The features allow efficient sorting of risks.  
The VDD user is able to select a “Risk” window, which 
provides access to the entire risk repository containing 
individual risk forms.  VDD also has a “Help” function, 
which assists unfamiliar users in finding documents or 
performing functions within VDD easily. 
Risk forms contain all information pertaining to 
particular risks within functional areas of the system.  
The names of the Risk Owners (to be discussed in the next 
section), risk assessments, status and mitigation 
activities are contained on risk forms.  Users may review 
risks and status of mitigation actions as well as generate 
new risks.  An automatic risk notification system alerts 
other functional areas and program leaders to emerging 
risks and changes in risk status by generating e-mails 
containing links to view electronic risk forms.  Figures 
17, 18, 19 and 20 provide examples of VDD pages. 
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Figure 17.   Virtual Design Database (VDD), from 
(Rob Kepner, EPMC Brief, 2002). 
 
Electronic Risk Forms allow VDD users to perform 
a myriad of functions.  One may enter a new risk into the 
system, check the status of current risk mitigation actions 
on risks designated by specific risk numbers, update risk 
status, etc.  Risk form editing is electronically 
restricted to the designated Risk Owners and others 
Government and contracting personnel specifically 
authorized to edit files.  
Figures 18, 19 and 20 illustrate the VDD’s access 
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Figure 18.   VDD Path to Risk Forms, from (Rob 




Figure 19.   VDD Risk Form from (Rob Kepner, EPMC 
Brief, 2002). 
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Figure 20.   Organization of Risks on VDD, from (Rob 
Kepner, EPMC Brief, 2002). 
 
b. Virtual Integration and Assembly (VINTEGRA) 
The AAAV Virtual Integration and Assembly system 
(VINTEGRA) is an engineering and manufacturing tool 
designed to support the continual refinement of system 
assembly and integration.  VINTEGRA is a subset of VDD with 
many of the same characteristics: accessibility, personal 
computer interface, automatic e-mail notification, etc.  
VINTEGRA is intended to capture and facilitate integration 
and assembly (I&A) and production data.  The data leads to 
the identification of risks associated with I&A and 
production.  VINTEGRA, relying on software called 
ProProcess, provides shop mechanics with a paperless source 
of manufacturing and assembly instructions.  VINTEGRA is 
located on AAAV’s Intranet.  Shop mechanics use a standard 
Internet browser, i.e., Internet Explorer, to access 
VINTEGRA’s drawings and assembly instructions.  VINTEGRA 
may be accessed through computer aided design (CAD) 
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workstations in the assembly area or on desktop computers 
anywhere on AAAV’s network.  “Traditional ‘blue-print’ 
style line drawings of the design have been replaced by 
computer images rendered in the vividness of three 
dimensions (3-D).” (Defense Modeling and Simulation Office, 
1999) 
Multiple computer stations surrounding the 
vehicle hulls undergoing assembly are available to the shop 
mechanics for reference.  VINTEGRA allows shop mechanics to 
electronically view the proper sequence and method of 
assembly prior to working on the actual hull.  Mechanics 
control the speed at which they learn the self-paced 
assembly instruction.   
Design imperfections and changes are anticipated 
during prototype build.  VINTEGRA is an interactive system.  
Mechanics may provide input to engineers if they encounter 
problems during assembly through an electronic problem 
reporting system. 
VINTEGRA contains an Electronic Problem 
Resolution System (EPRS) which allows for “real-time 
capture of assembly problems as they are discovered.” 
(Defense Modeling and Simulation Office, 1999)  If a 
mechanic encounters problems applying assembly instruction, 
then he or she can mark up the Computer Aided Design (CAD) 
images to illustrate the exact location and nature of the 
discrepancy.  Because VINTEGRA resides on AAAV’s Intranet, 
the mechanic’s corrections or indicated problem areas are 
immediately brought to the attention of engineering and 
design teams via electronic dissemination.  The teams, in 
turn, may make real-time changes to the assembly process or 
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identify potential change requirements for the next design 
iteration via the configuration management process.   
The EPRS form contains the following major 
subject headings:  
· Problem Identification 
· Problem Description 
· Disposition of Short Term Fix 
· Verification of Short Term Fix 
· Disposition of Long Term Fix 
· Verification of Long Term Fix 
Shop mechanics can affect wide dissemination of 
the EPRS though VINTEGRA.   
The AAAV Team won the 1999 Defense Modeling and 
Simulation Office Award for VINTEGRA.    
2. AAAV Team PDRR Risk Management Process 
The program’s objective during PDRR is to continue to 
develop the design and engineering maturity of the system 
as well as to identify, assess and handle risks.  Technical 
risks tend to attract the majority of attention during 
PDRR. 
The AAAV, Government program office contractually 
mandated that GDAS institute the program’s risk management 
process during PDRR.  The AAAV Program Manager (PM) 
approved and oversaw the process.  A risk management plan 
and its implementation by GDAS were second period award fee 
criteria during PDRR based on the Milestone II contract 
award.  The next section addresses Risk Management through 
the contracting process in greater detail.   
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The AAAV Team’s risk management process involved five 
steps: 
· Risk Identification 
· Risk Analysis and Prioritization 
· Risk Planning 
· Risk Tracking 
· Risk Control (AAAV Independent Risk Assessment, 
March 2000) 
a. AAAV PDRR Risk Identification 
The first step in the AAAV risk management 
process during PDRR was Risk Identification.  Any number of 
individuals or groups was empowered to identify risks and 
initiate the management process.  Individuals, an IPT or 
any internal or external AAAV stakeholder could identify 
new or existing candidate risks.  Existing risks could be 
transferred from one IPT to another depending on th e nature 
of the risk and an IPT’s expertise.  New risks were 
initiated by sending an e-mail or holding a conversation 
with an IPT lead or the program Risk Management Coordinator 
(RMC).  Existing risks were transferred by one IPT to 
another or by the Risk Resolution Board (RRB). (GDAS PDRR 
Risk Primer, April 1998)  
The Joint Risk Resolution Board (RRB) was a Joint 
DRPM/GDAS board designed to analyze and resolve risk issues 
that required senior DRPM and GDAS attention for 
resolution. 
At the RRB, IPTs presented risk summaries to the 
board members.  Briefs highlighted risk area trends and 
emerging risks by IPT.  The risks were categorized as High, 
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Moderate or Low-level risks.  The AAAV Team categorized 
risks in the following manner: 
· High Risk (Red): Risk is most likely to cause 
major program impact/disruption.  For these 
risks, a different approach may be required to 
successfully complete EMD.  Priority management 
attention should be applied. 
· Moderate Risk (Yellow): Risk can cause some 
program impact/disruption.  Risk can be 
resolvable during EMD by proper implementation of 
mitigation efforts that may involve a different 
approach.  Additional management attention may be 
needed. 
· Low Risk (Green): Risk is at an acceptable level 
with minimal or no known impact. (Independent 
Risk Assessment Team (IRAT), 2000) 
Each risk was listed by IPT name and by Risk 
Identification number as seen on the VDD for purpose of 
reference. (AAAV Program Office Risk Resolution Board 
Presentation, November 1997) 
The RRB had several objectives.  First to provide 
senior leadership with decision support information and 
ensure cross-functional area communication.  Decision 
criteria included the commitment of additional resources, 
acceptance of risk, trade offs and mitigation courses of 
action.  Secondly, to provide a forum where decisions were 
made jointly between GDAS and the Government using the same 
data.  Third, the RRB was the appropriate forum to close 
out risks nominated for this action.  The RRB ensured that 
the risk management process was performed as intended.  
Lastly, the RRB intended to reduce risk processing and 
handling cycle time to facilitate decision-making at the 
earliest possible opportunity. (Kepner, 2002)   
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Once a candidate risk was identified, the issue 
became an IPT or RRB agenda item.  Doctrinally, IPTs 
reviewed candidate risks weekly and existing risks bi-
weekly while the RRB reviewed program-level risk 
continually.  The RRB attempted to meet formally on a 
monthly basis as a “decision-making forum.” (GDAS PDRR Risk 
Primer, April 1998)  The RRB and IPTs reviewed candidate 
risks to determine one of the following courses of action: 
· Control the risk 
· Accept the risk 
· Reduce the risk 
· Transfer the risk (Kepner, 2003) 
Determinations on candidate and existing risks 
were made within five working days of identification and 
initial discussion.  Candidate risks of minor severity were 
classified as Action Items.  IPTs posted Action Items on 
the AAAV Action Item database found on the VDD.  Either the 
accepting IPT or RRB entered risks on the VDD accompanied 
by a mitigation plan.  Figure 21 illustrates the AAAV, PDRR 
Risk Management Process with the Risk Identification step 
highlighted in gray.   
When a risk was identified and acceptance 
assigned, the process required further action.  Formal 
assignment or assumption of Risk Ownership was required for 
each risk entered into VDD.   
The goal was to resolve and close risks at the 
lowest possible level.  When a risk was discovered during 
PDRR, the Government and GDAS counterparts who uncovered 
and introduced the risk became “Risk Owners” for that risk.  
They jointly assumed responsibility for the risk from its 
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cradle to grave.  Risk Owners were identified by name on 
all risk forms on the VDD to disseminate the overall 
responsibility for the particular risk.  Risk owners were 
responsible for formally introducing new risks into the VDD 
through risk forms. 
Risk forms indicated the nature and severity of 
the risk as well as actions to be taken to mitigate the 
risks.   
The purpose of the risk forms was to provide an 
assessment of current risks and estimate risk resolution 
requirements and timelines.  A critical function of the 
risk introduction, assessment and mitigation process was to 
identify resources required to mitigate risks.  Risk Forms 
also contained fields for the entry of “Estimated Recovery 
Date” of the risk.  Time estimates were designed to allow 
the program office to analyze variances in actual versus 
estimated risk mitigation times. 
While risks were jointly owned between GDAS and 
the Government, the Government assumed overall 
responsibility for the risk and its management.  Should a 
situation occur that a risk could not be resolved and 
closed at the lowest level possible, the risk was elevated 
through the IPT hierarchy to the Joint Risk Resolution 
Board (RRB) for resolution. 
The next step in the risk management process was 
Risk Analysis and Prioritization. 
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Figure 21.   AAAV PDRR Risk Management Process: Risk 
Identification, from (GDAS PDRR Risk Primer, 
April 1998). 
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b. AAAV PDRR Risk Analysis and Prioritization 
The PDRR risk analysis and prioritization process 
began upon identification and acceptance of the risk.  
Within five working days, the owning IPT or RRB was 
required to initiate a Risk Management Form in VDD.  Risk 
forms in VDD were matched with corresponding Work Breakdown 
Structure (WBS) numbers.  The IPT or RRB assigned Keywords 
to risk forms.  Keywords were “fields which enabled the 
user to specify unique terminology associated with the risk 
and aid in the early identification of trends, 
establishment of triggers and prioritization of constrained 
resources at the IPT and system level.” (GDAS PDRR Risk 
Primer, April 1998)  Keywords were classified as product, 
practice or process: 
· Product Keywords: Names of mechanical, 
structural, software systems or subsystems unique 
to AAAV 
· Practice Keywords: Categorized into one of six 
classes: Acquisition, Design, Facilities, 
Logistics, Manufacturing and producibility or 
Test and Evaluation 
· Process Keywords: Categorized into six classes, 
which represent “DoD Best Practices”: Design, 
Test, Production, Facilities, Logistics and 
Management (GDAS PDRR Risk Primer, April 1998) 
The AAAV RMC performed regular query-based 
searches of the database to identify trends in keywords and 
report the findings to the RRB. 
Risk analysis included the Risk Owner preparing a 
risk statement as a part of the VDD Risk Form.  The purpose 
of the risk statement was to “quantify the cause of the 
risk and specify which requirement(s) cannot be satisfied 
if the risk is not mitigated.”  The risk consequences field 
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on VDD served to “quantify the effect of degraded 
operational performance, increased cost, decreased 
reliability, schedule slip, etc. if the risk was not 
mitigated.” (GDAS PDRR Risk Primer, April 1998)  The PDRR 
Risk Analysis and Prioritization process is highlighted in 
Figure 22. 
c. AAAV PDRR Risk Planning 
The third step in the PDRR risk management 
process was Risk Planning.  Risk planning “includes all 
management aspects of dealing with risk by choosing a 
specific course of action for mitigation among the several 
alternatives available.” (GDAS PDRR Risk Primer, April 
1998)  Risk planning included risk mitigation and risk 
tracking VDD entries. 
Risk mitigation plans included the following 
elements: 
· Probability of occurrence 
· Assessed risk level 
· Mitigation plan and history 
· Estimated recovery date 
· Risk tracking 
· Watch list inclusion 
· Date closed (GDAS PDRR Risk Primer, April 1998) 
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Figure 22.   AAAV PDRR Risk Management Process: Risk 
Analysis and Prioritization, from (GDAS PDRR Risk 
Primer, April 1998). 
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The estimated recovery date was a mandatory entry 
and reflected the IPTs time estimate required to mitigate 
the risk.  When the approving authority determined a risk 
to be fully mitigated or no longer relevant, then the risk 
was closed on VDD.  The risk tracking entry allowed the 
risk owner to select between “Off-track” or “Monitor 
closely” depending on the severity of the risk and the 
progress of the mitigation efforts.  “Off-track” 
highlighted a risk that was out of tolerance and “monitor 
closely” brought attention to a risk area that was 
approaching tolerance limits.  The categories allowed 
managers to prioritize risk areas.   
Included in the mitigation plan was the assessed 
risk level determined by the probability of occurrence and 
the severity of impact to the program.   
Risk mitigation plans included all activities to 
be conducted and resource estimates in order to mitigate 
the risk.  All mitigation activities needed to be completed 
prior to the estimated recovery date.  The risk’s history 
was updated each time an IPT revised a risk form.  The 
mitigation history provided traceability. (GDAS PDRR Risk 
Primer, April 1998) 
Risks were assessed and categorized into facets 
of program impact: 
· Technical Performance: Risk associated with the 
enhancements of the design to maximize 
performance 
· Cost: Risks that impact budget 
· Schedule: Risks that impacts Milestones and 
Decision Points 
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· Programmatic: Risks related to resources (people, 
equipment, facilities, funding, etc.) and 
functions of the business 
· Supportability: Risks associated with fielding 
and maintaining the current system (DRPM AAA, 
Risk Mitigation Planning Guidance for the Risk 
Owner, 2002) 
The probability of the risks’ occurrence and the 
severity of impact on one or more of the above mentioned 
categories determined the overall risk assessment: Low, 
Moderate or High.  Figure 23 depicts the AAAV PDRR Risk 
Assessment matrix. 
 
  a Remote
  b Unlikely
  c  Likely
  d      Highly Likely
  e        Near Certainty
                  What is the Likelihood
Level           the Risk will Happen
HIGH - Unacceptable.  Major
disrupt ion l ikely.   Di f ferent
approach required.  Priority
m a n a g e m e n t  a t t e n t i o n
required.
M O D E R A T E  -  S o m e
d i s r u p t i o n .   D i f f e r e n t
approach may be required.
A d d i t i o n a l  m a n a g e m e n t
attention may be needed.
L O W  -  M i n i m u m  i m p a c t .
Minimum oversight needed to
ensure risk remains low
  LEVEL                COST             SCHEDULE                       TECHNICAL                     PROGRAMMATIC               SUPPORTABILITY
                                                                                       PERFORMANCE
      1                   Minimal or                 Minimal or                                     Minimal or                                          Minimal or      Minimal or
                           No Impact                 No Impact                                     No Impact                                           No Impact      No Impact
     2                      <5%                Additional Resources            Acceptable with some                                 Additional Resource Acceptable with some
                                                              Required                         reduction in Margin                                               Required reduction in Margin
     3                      5 - 7%                Minor Slip in Key               Acceptable, with some Minor Slip in Key  Acceptable, with
some
                                                     Milestones: Not able              reduction in Margin Milestones: Not able     reduction in Margin
                                                to meet needed date Required          to meet needed date Required
     4                      7 - 10%                Major Slip in Key                       Acceptable.    Major Slip in Key         Acceptable.
                                                     Milestones: Critical               No remaining Margin Milestones: Critical  No remaining Margin
                                                           Path impacted     Path impacted
     5                       >10%               Can't Achieve Key                      Unacceptable.      Can't Achieve Key                      Unacceptable.
                                                   Team or major program Team or major program
Milestone           Milestone













Figure 23.   AAAV PDRR Risk Assessment Matrix, from 
(GDAS PDRR Risk Primer, April 1998). 
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d. AAAV PDRR Risk Tracking 
The RMC was largely responsible for risk tracking 
but relied on IPTs to continuously update risk histories 
and status.  The RMC conducted database queries to search 
for trends in keywords.  The RMC compiled the query results 
and presented them to IPTs and the RRB for analysis.  
Analysis sometimes included reallocation of resources to 
address emerging risks or trends.  The RMC served as 
secretariat to the RRB in the risk presentation and 
analysis process.  Figure 24 illustrates the PDRR Risk 
Tracking process. 
e. AAAV PDRR Risk Control 
Risk control was the day-to-day management of 
risks. (GDAS PDRR Risk Primer, April 1998)  This phase of 
the risk management process included the synthesis and 
decision-making and execution of risk area courses of 
action.  The IPT or RRB responsible for the risk determined 
one of the following courses of action in consonance with 
the RMC: 
· Close the risk and document lessons learned 
· Evaluate the need for re-planning strategies and 
system-level workarounds 
· Invoke alternative mitigation and contingency 
plans 
· Continue to track the risk and execute its 
mitigation 
The authority to make decisions on existing risks 
was based on the review and approval authority matrix shown 
in Figure 25. 
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Figure 24.   AAAV PDRR Risk Management Process: Risk 
Tracking, from (GDAS PDRR Risk Primer, April 
1998). 
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The formal PDRR risk management process began on 
conditions of a Cost Plus Award Fee contract at the 
beginning of PDRR.  GDAS developed the risk management 
process and the Government approved it.  The emphasis of 
the risk management process was on resolving technical 
risks during PDRR.   
The following section discusses risk management 
through the contracting process during PDRR.   
Origination 
Source
Mitigation Plan Review 
and Approval
Authorized to Closeout 
Risk
High A-Level IPT A-Level IPT Risk Resolution Board
B-Level IPT A-Level IPT Risk Resolution Board
C-Level IPT B-Level IPT Risk Resolution Board
D-Level IPT C-Level IPT Risk Resolution Board
Moderate A-Level IPT A-Level IPT Risk Resolution Board
B-Level IPT A-Level IPT A-Level IPT
C-Level IPT B-Level IPT B-Level IPT
D-Level IPT C-Level IPT C-Level IPT
Low A-Level IPT A-Level IPT A-Level IPT
B-Level IPT B-Level IPT B-Level IPT
C-Level IPT C-Level IPT C-Level IPT
D-Level IPT D-Level IPT D-Level IPT
 
Figure 25.   AAAV PDRR Risk Review and Approval 
Authority Matrix, from (GDAS PDRR Risk Primer, 
April 1998). 
 
3. Risk Management Through the Contracting Process 
This thesis introduced in Chapter II several methods 
to reduce risk through the contracting process.  Examples 
include risk-based Requests For Proposal (RFP), weighting 
of source selection evaluation criteria, Statement of 
Objectives (SOO) language and contractual incentives.  This 
thesis presents the AAAV program’s use of contractual 
awards to incentivize risk management.  
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Following the Milestone I decision, the Government 
awarded GDAS a Cost Plus Award Fee (CPAF) contract for the 
PDRR phase.  The PDRR Statement of Work (SOW) required GDAS 
to have a risk management plan. (Kepner, 2002)  The PDRR 
Second Period Contract Award Fee plan was tied to GDAS’ 
risk management performance.  The DRPM AAA established 
performance criteria to evaluate GDAS’ risk management 
program and supervised the process implementation during 
PDRR.   
GDAS’ full award fee amount depended, in part, on its 
ability to implement an effective risk management program 
and manage risks during the period.   
4. Government and Prime Contractor Co-Location 
The AAAV DRPM and GDAS have co-located at the AAAV 
Technology Center in Woodbridge, VA and the Worth Avenue 
Technology Annex (WATA) in Dale City, VA three miles south 
of Woodbridge.  Both facilities are two-story buildings 
with the DRPM AAA occupying the top floor and GDAS the 
bottom floor.  Both facilities have assembly areas where 
AAAV command mock ups and personnel variant prototypes were 
assembled during PDRR and continue to be assembled in SDD.  
The AAAV Team’s co-location is truly unique in defense 
acquisitions.  Government and Prime Contractor co-location 
is intended to enhance communications and reduce program 
risks inherent with limited cross-functional area 
interaction.  One objective of co-location is to facilitate 
the Integrated Product and Process Development (IPPD) 
environment.  Communication is crucial to successfully 
implementing an IPPD process. 
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a. Integrated Product and Process Development 
(IPPD) 
Chapter II of this thesis introduced Integrated 
Product and Process Development (IPPD).  The DoD defines 
IPPD as “a management process that integrates all 
activities from product concept through production/field 
support, using a multifunctional team, to simultaneously 
optimize the product and its manufacturing and sustainment 
processes to meet cost and performance objectives.” 
(Department of the Navy Acquisition, March 2000)  IPPD is a 
systems engineering process that incorporates the use of 
and interaction between multifunctional teams, or 
Integrated Product Teams (IPT).  This section provides 
examples of IPT interaction in the IPPD process during 
PDRR.   
b. AAAV Integrated Product Teams (IPT) 
The AAAV program uses twenty-eight IPTs with 
“membership representing every stakeholder in AAAV, from 
the Marine Users, Government Civilians, Industry (Prime and 
subcontractors), up through the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense.” (Pollution Prevention: AAAV, October 2002)  The 
IPTs are involved in every aspect of system development and 
the systems engineering process.  The AAAV IPT hierarchy is 
made up of four levels of IPTs as indicated in Figure 26.  
Figure 27 depicts the overall AAAV IPT environment. 
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Figure 26.   AAAV IPT Hierarchy, from (Rob Kepner, 
EPMC Brief, 2002). 
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Figure 27.   AAAV IPT Environment, from (DRPM AAA 
IPT Brief, October 2001). 
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Co-location allows IPTs to work in continual, 
close proximity with Government, user and contractor 
counterparts.  Numerous risk areas emerge during prototype 
development and production.  The opportunity for IPT 
members to work together and communicate across functional 
area lines on a daily, regular basis is critical to 
capturing and managing risks. 
In the area of Environmental Safety and Health 
(ESH), each IPT has a member who provides expertise and 
representation for ESH issues.  ESH issues play a 
significant role in the AAAV development.  ESH issues 
represent risk to the program in the form of large disposal 
costs, potential, adverse environmental impact and safety 
of use concerns.  The following section uses ESH to 
illustrate IPT interaction in the development of a complex 
system.  
c. AAAV Environmental Safety and Health Program 
The National Environmental Protection Act of 1969 
(NEPA) mandates Government consideration of environmental 
impacts imparted by system development, fielding and 
disposal.  In Chapter 5, the DoD 5000.2-R states: 
The PM shall evaluate and manage the selection, 
use, and disposal of hazardous materials 
consistent with ESOH regulatory requirements and 
program cost, schedule and performance goals. 
(DoD 5000.2-R, April 2002) 
The potential environmental impact of an 
acquisition system can create risks to the program.  Risk 
areas include cost (development, life cycle and disposal), 
schedule and performance risks.  The effective management 
of ESH issues in a developmental weapon system is critical.  
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ESH representation in the IPPD process is vital to 
addressing potential risks for trade off analyses. 
Throughout the AAAV’s early program definition 
and continuing through SDD, ESH issues have impacted the 
system’s design and planned production, fielding and 
disposal.  ESH factors can present significant risk to the 
program should the system fail to meet EPA standards or 
generate excessive costs attributable to minimizing 
environmental impact during operation or disposal.  The 
AAAV Team has worked together to ensure the optimal balance 
exists between the AAAV’s performance and System Lifecycle 
Costs.  
AAAV IPTs each included ESH representatives 
during PDRR.  The representatives were tasked with 
including ESH considerations during the system’s design and 
development trade off processes.  The intent was to ensure 
continual consideration of potential environmental risk 
impacts to the program throughout the design and prototype 
manufacturing process.  
5. Test and Evaluation (T&E) 
During PDRR, the AAAV program office produced three, 
fully functional prototypes for Developmental Testing (DT) 
and limited Operational Testing (OT): P1, P2 and P3.  
The DRPM AAA conducted extensive DT during PDRR.  P2 
conducted 4854 miles of land mobility testing: equivalent 
to nine vehicle years. (DRPM AAA, November 2002).  P2 was 
also used in an Early Operational Assessment (EOA). 
An EOA is a type of test “conducted prior to, or in 
support of prototype testing.” (Test and Evaluation 
Management Guide, November 2001)  A combination of AAAV PMO 
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Marines and 5th to 95th percentile users manned the vehicle 
during the assessment held in 29 Palms, California in 
October 2001.  The purpose of the EOA was to identify 
necessary design and configuration changes to the vehicle.  
The PMO also conducted a gunnery EOA to assess the AAAV’s 
weapon and fire control systems.  The EOA enabled the AAAV 
program to solicit feedback on the system from users at an 
early stage in the system’s development and testing. 
P1 and P3 were used primarily for water mobility 
testing.  P3 also participated in weapon station and land 
mobility test events. 
P1 and P3 testing included vehicle transition from 
water to dry land and vice versa.  The prototypes were 
tested in the high water mobility mode to assess the 
vehicle’s ability to achieve threshold high water speed 
requirements.  The program office conducted informal user 
juries with the five Marines who performed as DT vehicle 
crews.  The user juries were encouraged to provide 
continuous feedback to system design engineers throughout 
testing. 
In addition to land and water mobility testing, the 
AAAV prototypes underwent communication testing (with use 
of a vehicle mock-up), firepower testing, survivability 
testing, habitability testing and lifecycle support 
testing.  
Extensive survivability testing included mock-up and 
prototype test activities to evaluate the system’s armor 
protection and crew survivability.  In addition, the PMO 
placed significant effort in developing and testing an on-
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board automatic fire suppression system to increase crew 
survivability.  
Life cycle support testing consisted of logistics 
demonstrations, maintainability demonstration, mean time to 
repair (MTTR) demonstration, interactive electronic 
technical manual validation (IETM) and human factors 




Figure 28.   AAAV Survivability Testing, from (AAAV 
Developmental Test Brief, November 2002). 
 
E. SUMMARY 
During PDRR the AAAV Team worked to identify, assess, 
mitigate and track technical and programmatic risks.  The 
AAAV Team employed several tools and techniques to manage 
risk. 
General Dynamics Amphibious Systems (GDAS) developed 
information technology tools to assist in the risk 
management process during PDRR.  The Virtual Design 
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Database (VDD) was an Intranet tool designed to facilitate 
communication within and across both Government and 
contractor functional lines.  VDD contained a “Risk” 
section, which enabled IPT members to initiate, track, 
update, and disseminate risk items throughout the AAAV 
program office. 
Virtual Integration and Assembly (VINTEGRA) is an 
engineering and manufacturing tool that provides shop 
mechanics with 3-D views of system assembly instructions 
and processes.  VINTEGRA has an Electronic Problem 
Reporting System (EPRS) that allows shop mechanics to 
provide feedback to system designers and engineers on the  
assembly process and component design.  VINTEGRA provides 
real-time updates to technical data packages (TDP) shared 
by GDAS and the DRPM AAA. 
The AAAV Team encouraged system risk input at all 
levels.  Individuals who identified risks became “Risk 
Owners”.  Government and contractor counterparts shared 
risk ownership.   
Risk Owners could initiate, edit and communicate all 
subsequent inputs or changes to risk areas Online through 
the use of Risk Forms found on the VDD. 
Risks are ideally resolved at the lowest possible 
level in the IPT hierarchy.  Those risks deemed significant 
program risks or those incapable of resolution at lower IPT 
levels were elevated to a Joint Risk Resolution Board 
(RRB).  The Government and GDAS leadership comprised the 
RRB.  The purpose of the RRB was to provide the program 
leadership with decision support information and clearly 
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communicate risks across functional lines at the 
Integrating IPT level. 
The PDRR contract was a Cost Plus Award Fee (CPAF) 
type.  The award fee assessment included the evaluation of 
GDAS’ risk management plan and its implementation.  The 
Government used award fees as an incentive for the Prime 
Contractor to proactively manage risks. 
The AAAV Team is co-located in Woodbridge, Virginia in 
the AAAV Technology Center and the Worth Avenue Technology 
Annex; the facilities are approximately three miles apart.  
The DRPM AAA members and GDAS employees work in the same 
buildings.  The principal purpose of co-location is to 
encourage and facilitate continual communication between 
Government and contractor personnel and across functional 
lines.  Co-location is consistent with the principles of 
the systems engineering and IPPD processes. 
Co-location enables IPTs to meet regularly without 
significant travel requirements or disruption of other 
responsibilities in the program offices.  This thesis 
illustrates the program use of the IPPD process through a 
case study involving environmental safety and occupational 
health issues.  
Three AAAV prototypes underwent extensive 
developmental and early operational testing during PDRR.  
The purpose of the PDRR test plan was to identify 
performance risk areas and solicit user input.  The PDRR 
test plan included logistics and life cycle testing.   
The next chapter provides analysis of the PDRR risk 
management plan.  This thesis discusses lessons learned 
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from the PDRR phase and analyzes how those lessons learned 
have helped shape the AAAV risk management strategy during 
SDD. 
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V. ANALYSIS OF THE ADVANCED AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT 
VEHICLE (AAAV) RISK MANAGEMENT PROCESS DURING 
PROGRAM DEFINITION AND RISK REDUCTION (PDRR) 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter analyzes data presented in the previous 
chapter.  In Chapter IV, this thesis presented elements of 
the Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAAV) risk 
management program during the Program Definition and Risk 
Reduction (PDRR) acquisition phase.  The data was 
categorized into five areas of research: 
· AAAV Information Technology Tools 
· The Joint Government-General Dynamics Risk 
Management and Resolution Process 
· Managing Risk Through the contracting process 
· Government and Prime Contractor Co-location and 
the IPPD process 
· Test and Evaluation (T&E) 
B. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
This author’s research methodology involved extensive 
Internet and literary searches.  There are abundant 
resources available to research the Department of Defense 
(DoD) risk management environment and practices.  However, 
with the cancellation of the DoD 5000 Series of documents, 
further research is necessary in the future to ascertain 
the revised risk management directives and methodologies 
used in DoD acquisitions.  As this thesis is a case study 
of a developmental program that began under the DoD 5000.1 
and DoD 5000.2-R directives, the associated DoD risk 
management practices are evident throughout the program’s 
history from PDRR through System Development and 
Demonstration (SDD).  What will be of interest is how the 
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revised acquisition guidelines impact current and future 
risk management processes in developmental weapon systems 
including the Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAAV). 
This author visited the AAAV program office in 
Northern Virginia.  The ability to observe program 
operating procedures and interview both Government and 
contractor personnel was invaluable to this thesis. 
C. OBJECTIVE OF RESEARCH 
The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the risk 
management techniques the AAAV Team used during PDRR.  
Based on the analysis of the PDRR risk management process 
and techniques, this thesis intends to tie correlations 
between lessons learned from PDRR to the risk management 
process currently being used in SDD. 
D. ANALYSIS OF RISK MANAGEMENT TECHNIQUES USED DURING 
PROGRAM DEFINITION AND RISK REDUCTION (PDRR) 
The purpose of this section is to analyze the risk 
management techniques and processes the AAAV Team used 
during PDRR.  This chapter addresses risk management 
process changes from PDRR to SDD, the system’s current 
acquisition phase.  This chapter analyzes data in the 
following sequence: 
· AAAV Information Technology Tools 
· The Joint Government-General Dynamics Risk 
Management and Resolution Process 
· Managing Risk Through the Contracting Process 
· Government and Prime Contractor Co-location and 
the IPPD Process 
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1. Information Technology Tools 
The AAAV Team’s use of information technology (IT) 
tools during PDRR was invaluable.  The joint Government-
General Dynamics Amphibious Systems (GDAS) IPPD process was 
enhanced by the use of both the Virtual Design Database 
(VDD) and the Virtual Integration and Assembly (VINTEGRA).  
Recognizing the “communication multiplier” effect of tools 
like VDD, AAAV is developing a similar, upgraded 
application. (Kepner, 2002)  The following sections discuss 
the lessons learned and SDD perspectives of both VDD and 
VINTEGRA. 
a. Analysis of the Virtual Design Database 
The Virtual Design Database (VDD) provided the 
AAAV program office with a top-level view of the overall 
program.  In particular, VDD provided a central repository 
for risk forms containing identification, assessment, 
mitigation planning and flexible documentation.  VDD’s 
organization matched the system’s Work Breakdown Structure 
(WBS) from which the IPT organization was aligned.  VDD was 
a logical, Lotus Notes-based application that facilitated 
involvement at all levels in the risk management process.    
VDD’s built-in help function facilitated risk 
data entry.  Significant emphasis was placed on making VDD 
user-friendly in order to avoid discouraging IPT members 
from using the system.  VDD’s automatic, interactive risk 
notification system ensured widest dissemination of risk 
forms and updates throughout the program offices.  The 
automatic notification system was interactive because it 
required the determination of candidate risks to be made 
within five days of identification and electronic 
notification.  IPT leads and program leadership were 
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involved in risk identification, mitigation plans and 
tracking from the outset of new risks.  VDD helped to 
reduce the occurrence of poor communication within the 
program office.  VDD applications helped to implement the 
risk management process. 
Risks identified, assessed and entered into the 
VDD were required to contain mitigation plans.  The plans 
included estimated recovery dates and anticipated resources 
required to mitigate the risk.  Mitigation activities were 
tracked through the VDD as described earlier in this and 
the previous chapter.  
To manage technical risks, the AAAV Team 
conducted extensive Modeling and Simulation (M&S), Cost as 
an Independent Variable (CAIV) trade-off analyses, and 
advanced technology demonstrators (ATD).  The purpose of 
the ATDs was to evaluate the military utility and 
effectiveness of advanced technology concepts and to 
prepare to transition capabilities into the acquisition 
cycle.   
The AAAV PMO used ATDs and M&S extensively during 
PDRR to manage technical risks and perform trade off 
studies.  The AAAV PMO built a 4/5-size hydrodynamic test 
rig to prove the planning craft technology as well as an 
automotive test rig to prove the vehicle’s retractable 
suspension and lightweight track technology. (Kepner, 2003)  
In M&S, the PMO used the NATO Reference Mobility Model 
(NRMM) using AAAV vehicle characteristic inputs (approach 
angle, departure angle, weight, height, etc.) to simulate 
vehicle terrain handling and mobility characteristics.  
Both ATD and M&S activities were intended to greatly 
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mitigate technical risks at the outset of PDRR by 
identifying key system characteristics and identifying 
potential risk areas.   
The result of the risk management efforts during 
PDRR was the production of three fully functional AAAV 
prototypes. (Kepner, EPMC Brief)  VDD was a way of 
communicating the results of trade-off analyses and other 
risk mitigation activities.    
The VDD was an effective risk communication tool 
during PDRR.  One important characteristic of VDD was the 
“write once, read many” quality of the application. 
(Kepner, 2003)  “Write once, read man” illustrates VDD’s 
utility as a communications multiplier within the program 
office.  However, GDAS and AAAV Government personnel feel 
that the system was out-dated and incapable of being 
effective during SDD.  Some program office personnel 
considered VDD a risk repository that eventually became 
saturated with data. (Rose, 2002)  VDD lacked functional 
aspects that the program office feels are important during 
SDD: trend analysis, metric reporting capabilities, and 
analysis of variance (ANOVA).  GDAS felt that VDD risk 
mitigation plans were stand-alone documents, not fully 
integrated into the overall program management.  The 
Independent Risk Assessment conducted prior to Milestone II 
found that VDD was “more of a status report of activities 
or a list of planned events or meetings” rather than useful 
mitigation plans. (IRAT, September 2000) 
Subcontractors had limited access to VDD.  High 
and moderate risks owned by sub-contractors were 
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incorporated into VDD.  As the AAAV program grew, the need 
for an expanded system became evident. 
In SDD, the AAAV is developing an upgraded 
application that will replace VDD.  The new system, Life 
Cycle Information System (LCIS), is a web-based application 
that will allow all Government, Prime and Sub-contractors 
to access the database from AAAV desktop machines as well 
as remotely through standard Internet browsers.  Another 
impetus behind the development of LCIS is that the AAAV 
program has been designated as a Program Management Office 
of Life Cycle Support (PMOLCS).  A PMOLCS designation 
directs that a PMO maintain responsibility for the system 
from “cradle to grave.” (Kepner, 2003)  LCIS will be better 
equipped to support this function than was VDD. 
LCIS training is scheduled to begin in January 
2003.  The AAAV Team recognizes the importance of 
incorporating sub-contractors in the risk management 
process.  AAAV intends to fully train sub-contractors on 
LCIS and include them in the risk management process by 
offering this web-based application.   
GDAS, through their sub-contractor, Computer 
Systems Corporation (CSC), is developing LCIS to become a 
“customized document management system.” (Rose, 2002)  LCIS 
will be capable of conducting ANOVA when analyzing 
mitigation efforts.  LCIS will track projected resource 
outlays versus predicted outlays; determine the 
effectiveness of the mitigation plan; and alert program 
leadership to cost, schedule or programmatic impacts.  The 
AAAV Government team feels that LCIS will be able to 
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support a life cycle support system that emphasizes 
program-wide impact of risks.   
b. Analysis of Virtual Integration and Assembly 
(VINTEGRA) 
The Defense Modeling and Simulation Office 
awarded the AAAV Program Management Office (PMO) the 1999 
award for excellence in Modeling and Simulation.  The 
benefits gained from VINTEGRA during PDRR are already 
evident in SDD and anticipated during subsequent production 
activities. 
Refining engineering assembly knowledge benefited 
PDRR efforts by accomplishing “scope commonly done during 
Engineering and Manufacturing Development (E&MD) (now SDD) 
phase.” (Defense Modeling and Simulation Office, 1999)  
Furthermore, the “information captured using VINTEGRA in 
PDRR, significant data for production line analyses will be 
collected before the conclusion of PDRR.” (Defense Modeling 
and Simulation Office, 1999)  The data collected during 
prototype builds in PDRR will be applied to SDD vehicles.   
The SDD prototype vehicle assembly process 
benefited from the use of VINTEGRA during PDRR.  The 
assembly process has been refined and the Government and 
contractor have identified and corrected many manufacturing 
and produceability issues during the first three, PDRR 
prototype builds.  Both the Government PMO and GDAS 
consider production to be low risk partly due to VINTEGRA 
and the prototype assembly process.   
The process sheets in VINTEGRA are continually 
refined and updated.  In essence, the manufacturing process 
during PDRR and for prototype builds was a prototype of the 
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eventual manufacturing process.  The goal was to reduce 
risks associated with system manufacturability, such as 
schedule and cost risks. 
Shop mechanics’ familiarity with vehicle process 
sheets and the Internet-based browser and hyperlinks in 
VINTEGRA is expected to result in a learning curve effect.  
The benefits from the learning curve will be realized in 
the form of reduced vehicle build-time, or cycle time, and 
improved quality in manufacturing.  The result will be 
reduced risk of missing system delivery dates and costly 
re-work of the system at the end of the production process. 
Additionally, the re-use of VINTEGRA’s three 
dimensional drawings and process sheets are expected to 
avoid costs normally incurred in the development of 
Interactive Electronic Technical Manuals (IETM).  The 
electronic process sheet drawings have been validated and 
will be used in the IETM development. 
Electronic tools like VINTEGRA show potential for 
“shortening acquisition lead time and meeting war fighter 
needs faster, better, and cheaper, with the consequence of 
lower risk to the program.” (Defense Modeling and 
Simulation Office, 1999)  This will enable the Marine Corps 
to field a higher quality system to the war fighter at a 
lower design to unit production cost (DTUPC).  VINTEGRA has 
enabled the AAAV’s Integrated Product and Process 
Development (IPPD) to anticipate system changes early in 
the vehicle’s prototype design and manufacture.  
Implementation of necessary design changes early in the 
system’s development will reduce technical and integration 
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risks and the risk of increasing DTUPC and delayed system 
delivery.  
Realizing the success earned through the use of 
information technology (IT) tools during PDRR as well as 
the need to expand existing capabilities, the AAAV program 
continues to innovate acquisitions through its creative use 
of IT applications during SDD. 
The Department of the Navy (DoN) Electronic 
Business (eBusiness) Operations Office sponsored the DRPM 
AAA office to conduct a pilot program to pursue expanding 
VINTEGRA and, eventually, LCIS connectivity to remote 
sites.  Sites such as remote test facilities did not 
previously have access to the information and communication 
capabilities captured by the AAAV’s IT applications during 
PDRR.  AAAV’s creative IT innovations will continue to 
expand benefits in managing program risks during SDD by 
creating “virtual, integrated environments.” (Hepler, 2002)    
2. Analysis of AAAV PDRR Risk Management Process  
As discussed in the previous section, the AAAV PDRR 
risk management process relied heavily on the VDD to 
initiate, assess, communicate and track risks.  However, 
VDD was only a tool to help execute the formal risk 
management process. 
The PDRR risk management process involved five steps: 
· Risk Identification 
· Risk Analysis and Prioritization 
· Risk Planning 
· Risk Tracking 
· Risk Control 
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This section analyzes the PDRR risk management process 
and discusses the lessons learned.  The lessons learned 
from the PDRR risk management process helped to shape the 
proposed Government/GDAS risk management processes for SDD.  
At the time this thesis is being written, the formal SDD 
process is not yet implemented.  This thesis briefly 
discusses the interim risk management process.  The impetus 
of the risk management process is transitioning from 
technical to system-level integration risks.  However, the 
relevance of this analysis is in the discussion of what 
worked and what did not work during PDRR and how those 
lessons learned are put to use during SDD.   
a. AAAV PDRR Risk Management Process 
The AAAV PDRR risk management process was 
effective.  The primary goal was to identify, assess, and 
mitigate technical risk areas to support decision-making 
and design trade-offs.  By focusing on technical risk 
management, the AAAV program was able to conduct CAIV 
analyses and perform modeling and simulation activities to 
determine the most effective design characteristics with 
respect to cost, schedule and performance.  Key elements to 
the PDRR risk management process were ease of 
implementation via the VDD and effective communications of 
the process.  
The AAAV Team communicated the formal risk 
management plan through the IPT levels via a Risk Primer.  
The Risk Primer provided risk management process 
instructions intended for use as a desktop reference for 
risk management.  The Risk Primer was an easy to use, 
procedural nineteen-page document.  The intent was to 
introduce and include risk management in the normal 
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operations of the program office, not to bog IPT members 
down in formal methodology details.  The primer provided 
instructions on identification, analysis, planning, 
tracking and control processes and use of the VDD.   
The lesson learned was that a simplified risk 
management methodology education process is crucial to the 
successful implementation of a risk management plan.  The 
process and education, or training, must extend to the 
subcontractors as well as the prime contractor and 
Government personnel.  As the program transitions from 
development to production preparation, it becomes 
especially important to maintain a formal risk management 
process with all program stakeholders.  Once the SDD 
process is formalized, the program intends to incorporate a 
risk primer as part of the process training. 
The methodology the AAAV Team used to manage 
risks during PDRR was sound.  Because the majority of risks 
during PDRR were technical risks, the DRPM AAA RMC was a 
systems engineer with a part-time risk focus.  The RMC was 
well equipped to coordinate and manage risk areas because 
of the integral role that he played during the acquisition 
phase.  As the AAAV program transitioned from PDRR to SDD, 
the risk management coordination also transitioned. 
Additionally, shortfalls and limitations of the 
VDD are currently being addressed through the development 
of LCIS.  Currently, the AAAV Team uses shared drives 
available on all desktop computers connected to the 
program’s Intranet.  IPTs use standardized risk forms to 
initiate the risk management process.  The risk forms used 
in SDD differ from those used in PDRR.   
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The SDD risk forms are Microsoft Word documents 
that capture the risk assessment and other pertinent 
information, as a placeholder pending the full 
functionality of LCIS.  Figure 30 illustrates the current 
risk form the AAAV Team uses during SDD.  Risk forms 
contain information on the following: 
· Risk Ownership 
· Risk Title and description 
· Risk Assessment 
· Risk Mitigation Plan and status 
The current risk forms and their location on the 
DRPM AAA/GDAS shared drives are temporary while the program 
migrates from VDD to LCIS.  Risk owners are responsible for 
updating risk mitigation activities and assessments just as 
in PDRR.  DRPM AAA and GDAS personnel may access and review 
all risk forms contained on the shared drives.  Figure 29 
depicts an example AAAV SDD risk assessment form. 
While the AAAV program’s PDRR risk management 
process resulted in the successful deployment of three 
prototypes used in testing and production refinement, the 
PMO now benefits from lessons learned during PDRR.   
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Here’s a
sample Risk and 
Mitigation Plan.
      AAAV Risk Assessment Form Submitted by (IPT): Software
      Risk #:    69 (VDD = D-SFT-RSK-013) Risk Owner: C. Meconnahey Phone:   x7528 Date:    10/30/01
Risk Title:   Ability to Accurately Capture and Trace SRS-level Requirements in a Parallel Development Effort Last Revised:    01/24/02
    WBS: 1.01.15.00.00 Applies to:  SDD(EMD)       X         LRIP _____     PROD          .












1 2 3 4 5
Consequence
Consequence Driver(s)
Place X in highest one (s)
      Tech       Sched.       Cost
X
DESCRIPTION OF RISK
Condition:  The parallel software development effort (Ada and RoseRT) in SDD Block 1 Phase Build 6.X necessitates capture
and tracing of SRS-level requirements using separate methods.
Consequence if Realized:   Tracking and tracing SRS requirements using two different methods can produce unpredictable end
results.
Context:    The introduction of Object-Oriented Analysis and Design and a new supporting toolset (Rational RoseRT) within the
AAAV Project has precipitated the need for a parallel development effort for the early phase the SDD Build 6.0.  This parallel
effort, however, poses a risk to requirements management for Build 6.0.  To accommodate this parallel effort, SRS-level
requirements will need to be accurately captured and traced using separate methods.  The current method of capturing SRS-level
“Shall” statements and tracing them to the appropriate RDDs will be utilized for the Ada development effort.  The Woodbridge
facility will use RoseRT to produce models from the RDD and/or Use Case level requirements and trace RoseRT model elements
(capsules, classes, etc.) back to the appropriate RDD or Use Case requirements tagged in the Rational RequisitePro SDD Block
1-6X Project.
Risk Mitigation Plan (Implementation plan may be provided as an attachment)
Date Status Notes
Mitigation Task / Action / Event
Start Finish (started, etc.?) (Estimate risk at completion)
1 . Create one SDD Block 1-6X ReqPro project to capture SDD requirements
(ORD, S/SS, EFD, RDD, Use Case, Rose Model link)
09/13/01 TBD




Establishment of the parallel baseline
constitutes the starting point of scheduled
risk mitigation activity.  Termination is




1.1. Set trace links
2 . Capture SRS-level “shall” statements for the Ada effort manually, using the
same method as used for the PDRR Phase.
In Progress
 
Figure 29.   AAAV SDD Risk Assessment Form, from 
(AAAV Risk Mitigation Planning Guidance for the 
Risk Owner, November 2002). 
 
Those lessons learned are already helping shape 
and improve the risk management process during SDD.  The 
next section discusses several lessons learned from the 
PDRR risk management process and introduces what practices 
the program has adopted as a result of the lessons learned.  
b. AAAV SDD Risk Management Process 
The goal of an effective risk management process 
during SDD is to deliver: 
· Fewer unexpected costs 
· Better cost control 
· Improved adherence to program schedule 
· Enhanced vehicle performance (Risk Coalition Team 
Brief, June 2002) 
  98 
The current, SDD contract requires GDAS to 
develop for the Government’s approval a formal risk 
management process.  The process used during PDRR focused 
primarily on technical and system-level risks.  When 
consistently implemented, the PDRR risk management process 
effectively helped the AAAV Team to manage technical risks.  
Similar to the PDRR phase, the GDAS SDD risk management 
plan will focus mainly on technical and system-level risks: 
areas that are within the scope of their contractual 
effort. 
However, the DRPM AAA recognized that Government-
specific risks exist in SDD that are not adequately 
addressed or managed through a risk management process 
developed and implemented by the Contractor like that used 
in PDRR.  The types of risks in SDD are not the same types 
of risks encountered during PDRR.  There are more 
programmatic risks, which are not within the scope of GDAS’ 
effort.  Accordingly, the DRPM as well as the GDAS risk 
management processes needed to adapt to the program 
conditions. 
As a result, the Government is taking a more 
active leadership role during SDD to manage Government-
specific risks separately from system-level, technical or 
developmental Contractor risks.  DRPM AAA is modifying 
their risk management plan to enhance the focus on 
Government-specific risks such as funding, testing and life 
cycle considerations: those risks outside GDAS’ “sphere of 
influence.” (Risk Coalition Team Brief, June 2002)  
Meanwhile, GDAS is contractually obligated to develop and 
implement a risk management process for Government approval 
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and oversight through production.  The portion of the 
Government’s plan for technical risks will leverage off of 
GDAS’ plan since both the Government and GDAS will actively 
manage the technical risks throughout the SDD phase.  GDAS’ 
risk management is, again, embedded in contract award fee 
criteria during SDD.   
A lesson learned from PDRR is that risk 
management is a significant, continuous effort that 
requires “motivated personnel coordinating risk.” (Kepner, 
EPMC Brief)  Additionally, the frequency of risk management 
meetings must coincide with program activities and the need 
for increased attention.  For example, during the whole 
systems and subsystems trade processes, it is critical that 
risks be understood and managed as the system parameters 
and component capabilities are established. (Kepner, 2003)  
The risk management process, once approved and implemented, 
must be sustainable during all periods of SDD. 
The Independent Risk Assessment Team (IRAT) 
conducted prior to the MSII decision indicated that formal 
risk management practices waned during periods just before 
significant program events (i.e., prototype roll out, major 
test events, etc.) during PDRR.  Programmatic focus on 
achieving key milestones temporarily impacted “systems 
engineering processes” (Kepner, EPMC Brief) Systems 
engineering processes include risk management, requirements 
traceability, synthesis, etc.  The IRAT recommended that 
process sustainability be a key characteristic of the SDD 
risk management process.  Accordingly, the DRP M AAA 
directed that a program directorate assume risk management 
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process coordination consistent with the activities 
normally conducted during SDD.  
The AAAV Team formalized a functional, program 
office directorate called Program Planning and Integration 
(PP&I).  PP&I is responsible for the AAAV risk management 
plan and its implementation during SDD.  The Program 
Integration Division Head is part of PP&I and is the 
program Risk Management Coordinator (RMC).  Currently, both 
Government and GDAS members are refining the formal SDD 
risk management plan.  The Government side of PP&I also 
focuses on Government-specific risks and advises the AAAV 
Program Management Team (PMT).  The PMT consists of the PM, 
Deputy PM and Government Department Heads (i.e., Test and 
Evaluation Head, Manufacturing Head, Lead Engineer, PP&I, 
etc.). 
The RMC chairs a bi-weekly meeting to address 
programmatic issues at the Department Head level called the 
Program Management Team (PMT) II.  One of the focal points 
of the PMT II meeting is cross-functional risk 
communication and courses of action development.  The 
purpose is to enhance communication of risks at the action 
officer level in the program and support decision-making at 
the next highest level, the PMT level.  The PMT II advises 
the PMT on risk mitigation alternatives and resource impact 
for decision-making support.   
The PMT II is well suited to analyze system-wide 
metrics to assess the success of mitigation activities.  
Additionally, the meeting is used as a venue to discuss 
award fee determinations and recommendations for upcoming 
contract performance assessment reviews.   
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The need for the PMT II is essential during the 
SDD stage when the program transitions from development to 
production activities.  The increase in the number of 
program personnel makes communication even more critical.  
Additionally, the PMT II can perform many of the same 
functions that the Risk Resolution Board (RRB) did during 
PDRR without some of the drawback encountered with the RRB. 
The RRB was an effective forum to analyze risk 
areas and serve as a decision-making board at the highest 
program office level during PDRR.  The RRB process ensured 
dissemination of risks throughout the program from D Level 
IPTs to the PMT.  However, amid the RRB’s successes, two 
challenges eventually emerged that caused the AAAV program 
to adopt a different strategy during SDD. 
First, because the RRB relied on the senior 
program leadership, its frequency of meeting became 
difficult during especially busy time periods of PDRR.  The 
PDRR risk management process depended on the RRB to provide 
guidance and decision-making to function efficiently and 
consistently.  The RRB, though a good idea and effective 
when executed, lacked the sustainability characteristic 
needed in SDD. 
Secondly, some personnel from DRPM AAA and GDAS 
believed the RRB became a forum that did not always embrace 
risks as opportunities or foster an environment of open, 
non-attribution discussion.  One GDAS employee said that 
the RRB became a “moot court.”  The result was a 
disincentive for IPTs or stakeholders to identify and 
introduce risks into the risk management process.  The DRPM 
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AAA has responded by establishing the PMT II meetings, 
which serve as the Risk Coalition Team (RCT). 
The RCT is “a team of Government personnel 
chartered as owners of the risk management process.  Its 
primary purpose is to facilitate the creation and 
continuous operation of the risk management process.” 
(Draft DRPM AAA SDD Risk Management Plan, November 2002)  
The SDD RMC (Program Integration Branch Head) chairs the 
RCT.  The RCT includes members from the following DRPM AAA 
directorates: 
· PP&I 




· Engineering representatives 
· DCMA representatives (Draft DRPM AAA SDD Risk 
Management Plan, November 2002) 
The biggest difference between the RRB used in 
PDRR and the RCT used in SDD is the organization’s 
membership.  The RRB consisted mainly of Division Directors 
whereas the RCT is comprised of the next lower level, the 
Department Heads or PMT II members.  The benefit in the 
revised structure is that the RCT performs the majority of 
detailed risk analysis so they can then provide 
recommendations and courses of action to the PMT.  The RCT 
can filter and solve many problems before coming to the 
attention of the PMT allowing the PMT to focus on higher 
level, Government-specific risk areas.  The RCT meets bi-
weekly as part of the PMT II meetings.   
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Another risk management technique the DRPM AAA 
used during PDRR was inviting an Independent Risk 
Assessment Team (IRAT).  The purpose of the IRAT in PDRR 
was to evaluate the effectiveness of the program’s risk 
management process and provide recommendations for SDD. 
c. Periodic Risk Assessments 
During PDRR, the AAAV Team conducted periodic 
internal and external risk assessments of the program’s 
risk management process.  Prior to Milestone II, the AAAV 
Team requested an independent risk assessment to evaluate 
the status of the program’s technical risks and the risk 
management process prior to entry into the System 
Development and Demonstration (SDD) Phase.  
EG&G, DRPM AAA’s risk management support 
contractor, nominated a “three-member team of experienced 
engineers” to conduct the assessment.  The Independent Risk 
Assessment Team (IRAT) was made up of EG&G Technical 
Services representatives and chaired by a representative 
from the Illinois Institute of Technology Research 
Institute who were also co-authors of the NAVSO Guide “Top 
Eleven Ways to Manage Technical Risks.”  (IRAT Report, 
September 2000)   
The DRPM AAA tasked the IRAT with conducting an 
impartial assessment of the AAAV risk management program.  
The AAAV DRPM planned to integrate the IRAT’s findings into 
part of the Milestone II Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) 
documentation.  (AAAV Independent Risk Assessment Brief, 
March 2000) 
The risk areas of interest were product and 
technical process risks. (IRAT Report, 2000)  The AAAV Team 
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intended to use the IRAT findings to prepare for the 
upcoming Milestone II decision, identify technical and 
process risks associated with entering SDD and evaluate 
risk-handling procedures during PDRR.  The DRPM provided 
IPT briefings and disclosed extensive technical and program 
documentation to facilitate the assessment. 
The IRAT’s methodology was as follows: 
· Review related program documents, such as AAAV 
Risk Management Plan, SEMP, Management Plan, ORD, 
TEMP and both the Program Definition and Risk 
Reduction (PDRR) and EMD SOWs 
· DRPM AAA IPT leads briefed the IRAT regarding 
implementation of risk management, issues/risks, 
and status 
· Follow-up with interviews, discussions and data 
gathering in selected areas 
· Prepare the IRAT report and out brief results to 
the DRPM AAA (IRAT, September 2000) 
The objective of the assessment was to provide an 
objective overview of the program’s risk management process 
and identify risk areas for entry into SDD. 
The DRPM AAA found the IRAT to be extremely 
useful.  The IRAT’s objectivity on the risk management 
process provided invaluable feedback that allowed the AAAV 
program to shape its future SDD processes.  The DRPM AAA 
intends to conduct periodic IRATs during SDD and in 
preparation for the LRIP decision. 
The risk management process discussed in the 
preceding section analyzed and introduced several of AAAV’s 
risk management techniques used during PDRR and SDD.  The 
next   analyzes one aspect of the AAAV program’s use of the 
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contracting process to reduce programmatic risks and 
transfer risk from the Government to the contractor. 
3. AAAV Risk Management Through the Contracting 
Process 
Following the Milestone I decision, the Government 
awarded GDAS a Cost Plus Award Fee (CPAF) type contract for 
PDRR.  Part of the second period award fee criteria was 
tied to GDAS’ risk management process.  Using contract 
award fees to provide contractors with incentives to 
proactively manage risk is an effective risk mitigation 
activity.   
GDAS uses an award fee sharing system among its 
employees.  Each GDAS employee earns a portion of the 
contract award fee.  A graduated scale determines the 
various amounts.  Employees earn percentages of award fees 
according to their position within GDAS.  Award fee 
sharing, or profit sharing, in organizations motivates good 
behavior and provides incentive for all contractor 
employees to perform.   
As a result of the award fee assessment, GDAS placed 
higher priority on risk management, from both a capability 
as well as training aspects.  It was at this time that GDAS 
developed the VDD risk management applications and 
formalized the process used during PDRR. 
The lesson learned was that contractually obligating  
and providing incentives for the Prime contractor to 
spearhead risk management efforts transferred some 
accountability for risk from the Government to industry.  
The Government was then prepared to evaluate the Prime 
Contractor’s performance and reward them accordingly 
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through contract period award fees.  The current SDD 
contract type is also a CPAF with award fee criteria tied 
to GDAS’ risk management process.  This also allows the 
Government to supervise GDAS’ technical and system-level 
risk management while concurrently implementing a 
Government-specific risk plan. 
GDAS’ award fee sharing system sustains employee buy-
in by financially rewarding its people for good 
performance.  The DRPM AAA’s contracting strategy is a good 
example of risk transference in DoD systems acquisitions.  
Once implemented, the AAAV risk management process relied 
heavily on Integrated Product Team (IPT) interaction and 
the Integrated Product and Process Development (IPPD) 
process.  The next section analyzes the AAAV program’s 
unique co-location and IPPD organization. 
4. AAAV PDRR Co-Location and IPPD Process 
The AAAV program’s co-location at the Woodbridge, VA 
facility fosters continual communication and interaction 
between Government and GDAS personnel.  This author 
interviewed both DRPM AAA and GDAS individuals concerning 
co-location.  Both groups were in agreement that co-
location allows for a great degree of real-time 
communication, which can reduce design risks, especially in 
the PDRR phase.  Synthesis is a vital step in the systems 
engineering process and communication is imperative to 
effective synthesis, as decisions are being made with the 
full understanding of the Government through its 
counterparts on the IPTs.  In addition to the communication 
benefits, both DRPM and GDAS personnel agreed that co-
location helps each group understand the other’s culture 
and therefore develop more effective working relationships.  
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In addition to the office space co-location, the vehicle 
assembly and production area located at the joint facil ity 
was of great value. 
Co-location at the point of vehicle assembly allowed 
nearly seamless system integration activities.  This 
facility reduced the risk of engineering and schedule 
problems by allowing GDAS and DRPM decision-makers to apply 
timely resources to friction points and fully understand 
the risks being mitigated.   
During a visit to the Worth Avenue Technology Annex in 
Virginia, this author saw active duty Marines, 
representative of the intended end-users, providing input 
during design and assembly of SDD prototypes.  This type of 
interaction greatly reduces the risk of systems not 
adequately accounting for logistics and supportability 
considerations during the design stages.  Had GDAS and DRPM 
AAA not been co-located, it is doubtful that user 
representatives would have as much opportunity to provide 
input and feedback in the design stages.  The alternative 
can result in time-consuming and costly system changes 
prior to fielding or once a system is fielded.  
Additionally, funding usually necessary for travel to bring 
IPTs or program leaders together is avoided by co-locating. 
Co-location is synonymous with the principles of 
Integrated Product and Process Development (IPPD).  
Continual cross-functional area communication is a large 
part of the IPT process.  Co-location allows the AAAV 
program to operate in an IPPD environment.    
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a. Integrated Product and Process Development 
(IPPD) and the AAAV Program 
The AAAV Team’s co-location facilitates the IPPD 
process and allows IPTs to work and interact on a frequent 
basis during SDD.  The AAAV co-location as an enabler of 
the IPPD process “provides the foundation and communication 
conduits for the IPTs to maximize the effectiveness of 
every member of the organization.” (Pollution Prevention: 
AAAV, October 2002)  The Government and GDAS co-location 
facilitates IPT integration and interaction between the 
Government and company engineers, logisticians, product 
managers, and other functions.  The program’s emphasis on 
cross-functional coordination and efforts has and will 
result in significant schedule and cost risk mitigation and 
avoidance.  In particular, the AAAV’s dedication to 
reducing and, in some cases, eliminating environmental 
safety hazards (ESH) in the system’s production will reap 
noteworthy Total Ownership Cost (TOC) and Lifecycle Cost 
(LCC) avoidances.  Each AAAV IPT has an ESH representative.  
The following section is a case study of the benefits of 
IPT co-location and IPPD interaction. 
b. Environmental Safety and Health (ESH) and 
the IPPD Process  
Environmental Safety and Health (ESH) 
considerations may constitute significant programmatic 
risks.  Such risks include safety of use, environmental 
impact of system use and exorbitant system disposal costs.  
In response to environmental risk considerations, the AAAV 
DRPM established an ESH Working Group (ESH WG).  The ESH WG 
was tasked to “identify, evaluate, track and assist with 
mitigation of ESH hazards.” (Pollution Prevention: AAAV, 
October 2002)  The ESH WG’s membership included both 
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Government and GDAS personnel who possess experience with 
ESH issues and environmental considerations.  AAAV IPTs all 
have ESH representatives.  The representatives ensure that 
ESH considerations and impact are part of all development 
and production decisions in the IPPD process.   
The ESH WG created the “first ever Risk Reduction 
Process, embedded in the VDD, to identify, track, and 
eliminate ESH hazards.” (Pollution Prevention: AAAV, 
October 2002)  The ESH WG identified and assigned “over 
five hundred ESH risk hazards” and “developed the ESH 
Database that provides the communication and tracking link 
for these hazards, the identification of the lead IPT for 
mitigation action, and tracking of the risk hazard 
resolution/acceptance.” (Pollution Prevention: AAAV, 
October 2002)   
The DRPM AAA developed an ESH Awareness Session 
for all members in AAAV IPTs. (Pollution Prevention: AAAV, 
October 2002)  The purpose of the ESH awareness session was 
to train and educate AAAV Team members on the potential 
risks associated with ESH.   
The DRPM AAA drafted the system’s performance 
specifications to include a ban on all Class I and II Ozone 
Depleting Substances (ODS) in the design and manufacture of 
the AAAV.  Additionally, the Government has contractually 
obligated both Prime and Subcontractors to eliminate the 
use of cadmium, lead, chromium and other environmentally 
hazardous materials in the production of the AAAV.  The 
deletion of these environmentally harmful substances will 
reduce the risks of negative environmental impacts and high 
disposal costs.   
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Over the life of the AAAV program, the AAAV 
anticipates cost avoidance of $379.9 million in production 
and $238.9 million in Operations and Support (O&S) costs. 
(Pollution Prevention: AAAV, October 2002)  The AAAV ESH 
initiatives have played a significant role in the projected 
cost avoidances through the application of the ESH Working 
Group (ESH-WG) and the Virtual Design Database. 
The U.S. Army’s Center for Health Promotion and 
Preventive Medicine (CHPPM) and the U.S. Navy’s Explosive 
Safety Review Board (WSESRB) stated that the AAAV’s “ESH -WG 
Risk Reduction Process is the best program of its type that 
they have encountered in DoD.” (Pollution Prevention: AAAV, 
October 2002)  The ESH-WG IPT representation ensures that 
ESH considerations are input throughout every design and 
manufacturing decision made for the AAAV.  Through the 
system decomposition and iterative design process, ESH 
input in the IPT process enhances the likelihood that the 
system is built correctly the first time.  This eliminates 
costly design or manufacturing process changes after the 
system is fielded or prior to demilitarization.  The ESH -WG 
and ESH IPT representation are examples of the benefits of 
the IPPD process in weapon system developments.  ESH risks 
were incorporated into the program’s risk management 
process during PDRR in the same manner as all other risks 
managed by IPTs.   
The relational VDD, discussed in preceding 
sections, allowed the entire AAAV IPT structure to have 
visibility on ESH risk identification, tracking, resolution 
and documentation issues.  The VDD has resulted in 
effective horizontal, vertical and cross communications 
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concerning ESH risk handling.  Because risks in VDD 
corresponded to WBS elements, the cause and effect 
relationships of ESH risks were easy to identify and 
assess. 
The AAAV program has taken proactive measures to 
reduce the system’s environmental impact.  These measures 
will lead to cost avoidance over the life of the program as 
well as preserving the environment.  The continual ESH 
assessment during the IPT process may have been less 
effective or ineffective had the AAAV program not been co-
located during PDRR.  The program’s co-location and 
commitment to IPPD enabled ESH considerations to be part of 
design trade offs and CAIV analysis. 
The AAAV performance specifications negate the 
use of several environmentally hazardous materials in the 
system’s production.  Offerors have had to develop and 
incorporate new, environmentally safe materials for 
integration into the AAAV.  For example, cadmium was 
eliminated because of the presence of cyanide and other 
hazardous materials (HAZMAT) in the plating process. 
(Pollution Prevention: AAAV, October 2002)   
Furthermore, the AAAV is testing a developmental, 
water-based Chemical Agent Resistant Coating (CARC) paint 
that will reduce Hazardous Air Pollutants (HAP) during 
manufacturing and repair of the system.  The use of a 
water-based CARC paint is expected to save $2.8 million 
over the life of the program.  (Pollution Prevention: AAAV, 
October 2002)  The new CARC paint may represent enormous 
savings throughout DoD for systems that require CARC.  Such 
developmental innovations may reduce future, developmental 
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system costs and reduce the risk of acquisition funds being 
diverted from procurement to support unanticipated O&S 
costs. 
Working with the U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency (USEPA), the AAAV program has also eliminated the 
use of all Class I and II Ozone Depleting Substances (ODS) 
and the majority of the USEPA’s top seventeen hazardous 
materials.  Savings as a result of the elimination of these 
hazards is expected to be in the tens of millions of 
dollars with even greater potential with DoD-wide adoption.    
Reduction of HAZMAT initiatives during the AAAV’s 
design and manufacture directly impacts Total Ownership 
Costs (TOC).  The AAAV’s avoidance of ODS and other HAZMAT 
will allow the system to enter its disposal phase without 
significant commitment of additional resources to make the 
disposal environmentally friendly.  The AAAV’s insistence 
that the Prime and Subcontractors use environmentally 
improved materials will result in savings in future systems 
LCC and Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) 
activities.    
ESH risk mitigation is just one example of the 
AAAV IPPD process.  Although other DoD programs that are 
not co-located effectively operate in an IPPD environment, 
the AAAV’s co-location encourages continual, cross-
functional area communication and constant interaction 
between GDAS and the DRPM AAA.  In order to determine the 
effectiveness and supportability of ESH initiatives, the 
AAAV team needs to thoroughly test the system.  The next 
section analyzes the AAAV PDRR test and evaluation plan. 
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5. AAAV PDRR Test and Evaluation 
The aggressive developmental testing (DT) and early 
operational assessment (EOA) performed during PDRR will 
benefit the AAAV program during SDD and subsequent 
production and fielding.  The results of the DT events and 
the EOA in PDRR allowed the AAAV team to identify what 
areas of the system required further developmental 
attention and testing.  The PDRR test results helped 
determine the SDD test plan.  On using test as a risk 
management tool, the DAU writes: 
Fixes instituted during early work efforts 
(Systems Integration) in the System Development 
and Demonstration (SDD) Phase cost significantly 
less than those required in later System 
Demonstration after the critical design review 
when most design decisions have been made.”(Test 
and Evaluation Management Guide, November 2001) 
Early testing can reduce the risk of run-away system 
delivery costs and expensive design changes late in the 
acquisition process.  By conducting an EOA during a 
Combined Arms Exercise (CAX) in 29 Palms, California, the 
AAAV program combined developmental and operational test 
(OT) activities.  DT under operational conditions, similar 
to those specified in the Operational Requirements Document 
(ORD), can reduce time and costs through concurrent 
testing.  When conducted too late in a program’s schedule, 
combined DT and OT events can result in OT failures and can 
impact milestone decisions.  Conducted early, the program 
can identify risk areas and develop mitigation and test 
plans to fix and validate deficiencies.  The DoD 5000.2-R 
encouraged combined DT and OT testing: 
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A combined developmental test and evaluation 
(DT&E) and operational test and evaluation (OT&E) 
approach should be considered when there are time 
and cost savings.  The combined approach must not 
compromise either DT or OT objectives. (DoD 
5000.2-R, April 2002) 
Data obtained from combined DT and OT events can be 
collected and potentially used in lieu of follow-on test 
events.  Coordination with service test agencies and the 
Director of Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) is 
important for obtaining and using test data. 
Another lesson learned from the AAAV gunnery EOA was 
that crew training and experience on the weapon system is 
critical to successful test execution.  The PMO is applying 
this lesson learned to the test crew-training plan during 
SDD. 
In addition, the program office conducted extensive 
testing on the MK46 weapons station to include a gunnery 
EOA.  The MK46 lethality tests met or exceeded all ORD 
requirements during PDRR.  In the course of testing, the 
AAAV program identified areas that will require additional 
study and follow-on testing in SDD such as ventilation and 
gunner training.  This knowledge helped the DRPM AAA 
develop the SDD test plan and concentrate on specific 
system components prior to additional OT.    
Other than the expected system performance-oriented 
test events, the AAAV program conducted extensive life 
cycle support testing during PDRR. 
Life cycle support testing included logistics 
demonstrations, maintainability demonstrations, mean time 
to repair (MTTR) demonstrations and human factors 
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engineering testing.  The significance of the AAAV’s PDRR 
test plan was its emphasis on life cycle support.  Life 
cycle support considerations will drive the AAAV’s life 
cycle costs (LCC).  Some estimates report that nearly 75 – 
80% of a system’s overall cost is assumed during Operations 
and Support (O&S).   
Test events designed to validate ORD-specified MTTR or 
operational availability parameters can reduce LCC and poor 
operational availability.  This can be achieved by 
including user juries during logistics demonstrations and 
MTTR demonstrations.  User juries can identify system re-
design recommendations to make the system more 
maintainable.  The system’s supportability will drive its 
operational availability.  Decreased repair requirements 
and cycle times will reduce maintainability costs and time.  
The result will be a supportable and available system for 
the intended user. 
Logistics can be a primary system cost driver during 
O&S.  Thoroughly testing a system during PDRR and SDD for 
supportability, reliability and maintainability can greatly 
reduced O&S costs and increases operational availability by 
identifying supportability risks early on in the program’s 
schedule.  Reducing the risk of unanticipated O&S costs can 
protect resources intended for pre-planned program 
improvements (P3I) and new developmental systems. 
The SDD test plan will focus on verifying design 
improvements identified in PDRR by testing an expected nine 
SDD prototypes. (Developmental Testing Brief, November 
2002)  The emphasis will be on addressing design changes 
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identified in PDRR and conducting OT activities in order to 
meet Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP) entrance criteria.   
E. SUMMARY 
This chapter analyzed the data presented in Chapter IV 
of this thesis.  This chapter discussed the author’s 
purpose of research and research methodology.  The primary 
purposes were to analyze and discuss the AAAV PDRR risk 
management strategy and connect the lessons learned in PDRR 
to the SDD risk management techniques. 
This chapter discussed AAAV PDRR information 
technology tools: VDD, VINTEGRA and LCIS.  The lesson 
learned from PDRR was that information technology tools 
could be force multipliers in managing risk.  VDD served as 
a central repository, or risk database.  VDD risk 
management applications facilitated the formal risk 
management process.  VDD’s automatic notification system 
enabled communication across program functional lines.  
Shortfalls in VDD have led to the development of LCIS 
during SDD.  LCIS aims to create a risk management tracking 
application that emphasizes trend analyses, reporting and 
program-wide risk management. 
VINTEGRA continues to reduce system production risks 
by identifying integration and assembly and production 
refinement requirements.  Additionally, VINTEGRA will 
reduce cost risks in the development of IETMs.  The program 
office expects IETMs to reduce maintenance delay times thus 
improving operational availability and logistics strains 
during O&S. 
The AAAV PDRR risk management process was effective.  
However, the program office learned valuable lessons from 
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its process and is applying lessons learned to the process 
used in SDD.  Namely, the DRPM AAA and GDAS instituted the 
PP&I directorate.  One of the functions within PP&I is the 
overall risk management process.  The program implemented 
the PMT II bi-weekly meetings.  Risk management is a 
statutory PMT II agenda item.  Through the PMT II, the RCT 
will manage program risks and develop courses of action to 
present to the program leadership for decision support.   
During PDRR, the Government incentivized risk 
management through the use of an award fee.  The CPAF 
contract type provided financial incentives for GDAS to 
execute sound risk management practices.  The Government 
awarded GDAS a CPAF type contract for SDD with risk 
management tied to award fee criteria, as well.  Including 
financial incentives in contract award fee criteria is an 
effective technique to transfer risk from the Government to 
a Prime contractor.  Both entities gain from effective risk 
handling as a result. 
The DRPM AAA has co-located with its Prime contractor, 
GDAS, in Northern, Virginia.  The AAAV program co-location 
has facilitated continual communication and interaction 
between Government and Industry personnel.  The close 
working relationship is consistent with IPPD principles.  
The AAAV program’s IPPD process has benefited from the 
communication advantages provided by co-location. 
Finally, the AAAV PDRR test plan included OT 
activities combined with DT.  The aggressive test plan 
allowed the program to identify areas that will require 
greater attention during SDD.  The results of the PDRR DT, 
OT and EOA have helped shape the SDD test plan.  The SDD 
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test strategy is to fix design deficiencies discovered 
during PDRR and prepare the system to meet LRIP entrance 
criteria. 
The next chapter concludes this thesis.  The purpose 
of the conclusion is to discuss how the AAAV SDD risk 
management strategy reflects the lessons learned from the 
PDRR risk management approach.  Additionally, the chapter 
discusses which elements of risk management practices the 
AAAV program is benefiting from most and provides 
recommendations for managing risk in developmental weapon 
systems. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter provides conclusions and recommendations 
drawn from the analysis of the Advanced Amphibious Assault 
Vehicle (AAAV) Program Definition and Risk Reduction (PDRR) 
and System Development and Demonstration (SDD) risk 
management strategies.  The benefit of this research is to 
illustrate risk management techniques used in Department of 
Defense (DoD) weapon system procurement and development 
through a study of the AAAV’s transition from PDRR to SDD. 
B. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This section discusses conclusions regarding risk 
management procedures used by the AAAV program during SDD.  
Based on the conclusions, this chapter offers 
recommendations for managing risk in DoD developmental 
programs.   
1. AAAV Information Technology Tools 
a. Conclusions 
Weapon system programs that use Information 
Technology (IT) tools or applications to complement risk 
management processes can effectively manage many of the 
risk areas discussed in this thesis.  The AAAV program used 
the Virtual Design Database (VDD) during PDRR to augment 
the formal risk management process. 
VDD enabled the program management office (PMO) 
to identify, categorize, communicate and file risks through 
a relational database available on the program’s Intranet.  
Acknowledging the need to expand VDD’s capabilities to 
manage risks during SDD, the AAAV PMO is developing Life 
Cycle Information System (LCIS).  LCIS expands on VDD by 
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incorporating applications that assist in tracking risk 
trends and conducting variance analysis to assess 
mitigation efforts: a capability the PMO recognizes as 
important in managing risks in SDD.  LCIS, a web based 
application, will improve the program’s communications by 
making the application available to sub contractors and 
potentially to remote test locations, as well.  It is being 
developed to support the anticipated future needs of the 
AAAV as a Program Management Office of Life Cycle Support 
(PMOLCS). 
The benefits that IT applications provide PMOs 
are numerous.  LCIS will expand on VDD’s ability to 
communicate emerging risks, track risk mitigation 
activities and conduct risk analyses to support program 
level risk management efforts.         
b. Recommendations 
Based on the conclusions discussed above, this 
thesis offers recommendations for managing risk in weapon 
system programs through the use of IT applications: 
· Develop and employ electronic resources to 
facilitate and complement the program’s formal 
risk management methodology 
· Make this IT resource available to all program 
stakeholders: Government, Support Contractors, 
Prime and Sub Contractors 
· Ensure all users are properly trained 
· Keep the application simple 
· The application should support the program’s 
specific goals or efforts in an acquisition phase 
· Anticipate desired expansion of the tool’s 
capabilities to satisfy program requirements in 
later program phases 
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· When practical, employ a dedicated program Chief 
Information Officer (CIO) to oversee IT 
initiatives 
2. The Joint Government-General Dynamics Risk 
Management and Resolution Process 
a. Conclusions 
A weapon system’s risk management process should 
be simple and sustainable.  The success of a process will 
depend in large part upon the degree to which its 
implementation does not detract from concurrent program 
demands.  Risk management is a continuous part of the 
system development and acquisition process.  All activities 
in the process should add measurable value to the program’s 
development and production.  Risk mitigation activities 
need to be tied to metrics to evaluate progress and 
efficacy of the efforts.   
The formal risk management process should focus 
on what is important to the program: meeting user 
requirements given time and resource constraints.  The 
process should involve senior leadership participation 
while maintaining an environment that encourages the airing 
and resolution of risks.  It should reward initiative and 
acknowledge the value of responsible risk acceptance while 
insisting on accountability and ownership of risk and its 
mitigation. 
b. Recommendations 
The analysis and conclusions of the AAAV’s risk 
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· The risk management process should be simple 
· A program management office should consider using 
a risk primer to familiarize and train personnel 
in the risk management process 
· A formal risk management process should be 
sustainable given program office workforce 
strength and anticipated demands 
· Risk management activities should add measurable 
value to the program 
· The establishment of a program directorate or 
division to oversee risk management can help to 
coordinate efforts, track risk trends and liaise 
with leadership 
· Metrics should be developed and employed to 
assess the success or failure of mitigation 
efforts 
· Program offices should consider periodic, 
external risk management assessments 
3. Risk Management Through the Contracting Process 
a. Conclusions 
Contract incentives tied to a Prime contractor’s 
risk management process are an effective tool to transfer 
risk from the Government to its industry counterpart.  The 
Government program office ultimately assumes responsibility 
for the success or failure of a system’s risk handling.  
However, tying financial incentives for the contractor to 
develop and implement effective risk management processes 
can result in improved contractor performance.  GDAS’ award 
fee, or profit sharing structure resulted in increased  
employee buy-in to the AAAV risk management process during 
PDRR.  As a result, the Government continues to provide 
contractual award fee incentives for GDAS to execute a 
proactive risk management process in SDD. 
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b. Recommendations 
As a result of the success the DRPM AAA has had 
in tying risk management to GDAS’ contract award fee plan, 
this thesis offers the following recommendations concerning 
risk management through the contracting process: 
· Transferring risk from the Government to 
contractors through financial incentives can be 
an effective method to achieve desired results or 
levels of effort 
· Profit-sharing organizational structures can 
incentivize good performance and employee buy-in 
4. Government and Prime Contractor Co-Location 
a. Conclusions 
The Marine Corps/GDAS co-location on the AAAV 
program has created an environment of continual 
communication between Government and Prime contractor 
personnel across traditional program lines.  The ease of 
communication and problem resolution decreases 
administrative delay times and miscommunications between 
Government/contractor counterparts.  Co-location at the 
point of vehicle design, testing, assembly and prototype 
production enhance the IPPD process by providing an 
environment for teams to truly integrate.   
The benefits of AAAV’s co-location are evident in 
the proactive management of risks such as those in 
Environmental Safety and Health (ESH).  Co-location allows 
Government and Industry personnel to identify and 
appreciate different organizational cultures.  
Understanding these differences enables both the Marine 
Corps AAAV team and GDAS to work towards establishing the 
most productive work environment for the benefit of the 
program.     
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b. Recommendations 
Recommendations concerning Government PMO and 
Prime contractor co-location are as follows: 
· Co-location facilitates communication and the 
IPPD process 
· Co-located PMOs can save time and money in a 
system’s developmental stages 
· User representatives involved on a regular basis 
in a system’s design for suitability can prevent 
costly and avoidable changes 
5. Test and Evaluation 
a. Conclusions 
The AAAV’s test program in PDRR included 
combining DT and OT test events in a challenging 
operational environment.  The lessons learned from the test 
results allowed the program office to know what its 
strengths and deficiencies were entering SDD.  This 
knowledge shaped the SDD test plan to prepare the system to 
meet LRIP entrance criteria.  Testing the system 
aggressively and early in the test plan reduced the risk of 
being forced to combine risky DT and OT events prior to a 
Milestone decision because of schedule compression.  
Including user juries and Fleet Marine Force (FMF) Marines 
in the EOA provided the program with relevant user feedback 
early in the system’s design stages when changes were 
possible and less costly.  The AAAV’s emphasis on life 
cycle support testing in PDRR represents the Marine Corps’ 
goal of reducing total ownership cost of the AAAV. 
b. Recommendations 
Based on the AAAV’s test history, this thesis 
offers the following recommendations: 
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· Conduct logistics and life cycle support tests 
with user juries early in the system’s 
development to avoid costly changes and reduce 
the risk of fielding an unreliable or difficult 
to maintain system 
· Combining DT and OT test events during PDRR 
allows a program to refine its SDD test plan to 
successfully meet LRIP entrance criteria 
· Include user juries in DT and OT test events 
whenever feasible to solicit feedback early in 
the system’s development 
· Ensure all personnel involved in test events are 
thoroughly trained and have sufficient experience 
to be able to execute required activities at an 
acceptable level of performance. 
This chapter concludes the thesis by addressing 
what conclusions and recommendations can be made from the 
analysis of data presented in previous chapters.  The 
following section provides suggested areas of further 
research in risk management and in the AAAV program. 
C. AREAS OF FURTHER RESEARCH 
The following areas of further research are suggested 
to expand upon this analysis of current DoD risk management 
practices in the development and procurement of complex 
weapon systems: 
· What impact do the revised DoD 5000 Series 
acquisition guidelines have on DoD developmental 
weapon system risk management practices? 
· How do the revised DoD 5000 Series acquisition 
guidelines impact the AAAV program prior to and 
following Milestone C? 
· What conclusions and recommendations can be made 
from an analysis of the AAAV program’s SDD risk 
management strategy?  
· What conclusions and recommendations can be drawn 
from an analysis of co-located and detached 
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program management offices regarding the impact 
of co-location on the IPPD process? 
· What risk management techniques are being used to 
manage software intensive programs?   
· What metrics can be used to evaluate software 
development and are they effective? 
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APPENDIX.  LIST OF ACRONYMS 
AAAV   Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle 
AAV   Amphibious Assault Vehicle 
AoA   Analysis of Alternatives  
APB   Acquisition Program Baseline  
ATD   Advanced Technology Demonstration 
CAD   Computer Aided Design 
CAIV   Cost as an Independent Variable 
CAN   Center for Naval Analyses 
CARC Chemical Agent Resistant Coating 
CAX Combined Arms Exercise 
CHPPM Center for Health Promotion and Preventive 
Medicine 
CIO   Chief Information Officer 
CPAF   Cost Plus Award Fee  
CSC   Computer Systems Corporation 
DAB   Defense Acquisition Board 
DAD   Defense Acquisition Deskbook 
DAU   Defense Acquisition University 
DoD   Department of Defense 
E&MD Engineering and Manufacturing Development 
EPRS   Electronic Problem Resolution System 
DRPM   Direct Reporting Program Manager 
DRPM AAA Direct Reporting Program Manager Advanced 
Amphibious Assault 
DT&E   Developmental Test and Evaluation 
ECP   Engineering Change Proposal 
EOA Early Operational Assessment 
EPMC Executive Program Managers Course 
ESH Environmental Safety and Health 
EV Earned Value 
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EVM Earned Value Management 
EVMS Earned Value Management System 
FMF Fleet Marine Force 
GAO Government Accounting Office 
GDAS General Dynamics Amphibious Systems 
GQM Goal, Question, Metric [paradigm] 
GSAM Guidelines for Successful Acquisition of 
Software-Intensive Systems 
HAP   Hazardous Air Pollutants 
IETM   Interactive Electronic Technical Manual 
I-IPT  Integrating Integrated Product Team 
I&A   Integration and Assembly 
IOC   Initial Operational Capability 
IPPD Integrated Product and Process Development 
IPT Integrated Product Team 
IRAT   Independent Risk Assessment Team 
IT   Information Technology 
ITP   Integrated Test Program 
JTAV   Joint Total Asset Visibility 
KPP   Key Performance Parameter 
LCAS   Landing Craft Air Cushioned 
LCC   Lifecycle Cost 
LCIS   Life Cycle Information System 
LRIP   Low Rate Initial Production 
MCCDC  Marine Corps Combat Development Command 
MDA   Milestone Decision Authority 
MNS   Mission Needs Statement 
M&S Modeling and Simulation 
MS   Milestone 
NEPA   National Environmental Protection Act 
NMS   National Military Strategy 
NSS   National Security Strategy 
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OMFTS  Operational Maneuver From the Sea 
ODS   Ozone Depleting Substance 
ORD   Operational Requirements Document 
O&S   Operations and Support 
OT&E   Operational Test and Evaluation 
PC   Personal Computer 
PDRR   Program Definition and Risk Reduction 
P3I   Pre-planned Program Improvement 
PM   Program Manager 
PMO   Program Management Office 
PMOLCS Program Management Office of Life Cycle 
Support 
PMT Program Management Team 
PP&I Program Planning and Integration 
RCT Risk Coalition Team 
RDT&E Research, Development, Test and Evaluation 
RFP Request for Proposal 
RM Risk Management 
RMC Risk Management Coordinator 
RMP Risk Management Plan 
RRB Risk Resolution Board 
SDD System Development and Demonstration 
SEI Software Engineering Institute 
SOO Statement of Objectives 
SOW Statement of Work 
SSP Source Selection Process 
TDP Technical Data Package 
T&E Test and Evaluation 
TEMP Test and Evaluation Master Plan 
TOC Total Ownership Cost 
TPM Technical Performance Measurement 
USEPA United States Environmental Protection 
Agency 
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VDD Virtual Design Database 
VINTEGRA Virtual Integration and Assembly 
WATA Worth Avenue Technology Annex 
WBS Work Breakdown Structure 
WG Working Group 
WSESRB Weapon System Explosive Safety Review Board 
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